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Comments
California Civil Code Section 48a:
Should the Judge or the Jury Determine
Whether a Retraction is Published in a
Manner Which is "Substantially as
Conspicuous" as the Original Article?
Sooner or later everybody will know the dirty little secret of American
Journalism, that the reports are wrong. Because sooner or later
everybody will have been involved in something that has been reported.
Whenever you see a news story you were part of, it is always wrong. It
may be a rather unimportant error, but it can also be an important one.
-Frank Mankiewitz1
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Errors are inherent in the publication and broadcast of news.
Many mistakes are so trivial that they are never discovered, even
by active participants in the particular news event. While some
mistakes are discovered, these errors may be so inconsequential
that those detecting the mistake do not feel the need to actively
solicit a correction or clarification from the media. In certain
instances, an erroneous publication or broadcast may be significant
enough to cause grievous harm to an individual. If such an error is
determined to be libelous, the publisher may be forced to pay for
its mistake in the form of damages to the injured party.2 However,
the common law and, more recently, statutes have afforded errant
publishers a partial or complete shield from liability for the
publication of defamatory statements.3
California, like several other states, provides a statutory means
by which a publisher of allegedly defamatory material can diminish
a significant portion of its potential liability.4 California's
retraction statute, Civil Code section 48a, requires both parties to
2. W. PAGE KEEIVN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON ThE LAw Op TORTS 842-43 (5th ed. 1984)
[hereinafter PRossnn & KEmON]. The measure and categories of damages recoverable are tempered
by constitutional privileges accorded specified defamation defendants. See infra note 40 (discussing
the allocation of damages in defamation suits in light of constitutional precedent).
3. See infra notes 28-41 and accompanying text (discussing the opportunity to mitigate
damages accorded a publisher of a defamatory statement under the common law and state retraction
statutes).
4. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 48a (West 1984) (enabling a publisher to escape liability for all
but special damages if specified statutory procedures are followed). See infra notes 55-70 and
accompanying text (detailing the language and requirements of California Civil Code section 48a).
See also infra note 35 (listing the states with retraction statutes).
5. California Civil Code section 48a uses the word "correction" instead of retraction;
however, subsequent judicial interpretations of section 48a have referred to the statute's "'retraction
requirement." Comment, What is a "Newspaper" under California's Retraction Statute? Enquiring
Minds Want to Know, 10 CoMM. & ENT. L. 801 n.29 (1988). Since the courts tend to use the words
"correction" and "'retraction" interehangeably, this Comment will do the same. Despite the
substantive similarity between the two words, each word's psychological impact on the media is very
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a defamation suit, the publisher and the injured plaintiff, to perform
certain tasks in order to receive statutory protection.6 In general,
section 48a promotes dispute resolution by requiring the defamed
party to serve a demand for retraction and the publisher to print a
retraction.
7
Section 48a's mechanisms are set in motion by the publication
or broadcast of statements which an individual believes to be
defamatory.' In response to the allegedly libelous remarks, the
different. As the counsel to the California Newspaper Publishers Association, Joseph T. Franke,
explained:
'Retraction' to a journalist has the ring of recantation-of the pressures imposed on Joan
of Are and Galileo. While a "retraction," like a recantation, suggests the coerced denial
or abandonment of one's principled beliefs, 'correction' does not. The operative word in
California's statute on the subject is 'correction.' Purging your usage of the more
emotional term is the first step to a sane policy.
Iowa libel Research Project, supra note 1, at 43 (citing to Franke, Reporting at Risk: Recognizing
and Avoiding Liability for Libel and Invasion of Privacy (unpublished manuscript) (1985)).
6. See infra notes 55-70 and accompanying text (discussing the statutory requirements that
section 48a places on both the publisher and the plaintiff).
7. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 48a(l)-(2) (West 1985).
8. In order to achieve a better understanding of section 48a, the following example of an
allegedly defamatory article is provided. On October 24, 1980, the San Diego Evening Tribune
published the following article:
Commentary
THE MESSY NEWTON-CARSON FEUD: SINGER MAY BE INVMNO SUIT.
By [Reporter]
Bouquets, Brickbats and other pertinent scraps from the cluttered note book of your
friendly neighborhood TV critic:
Wayne Newton, the slimy Las Vegas singer, may be playing with fire when he
implies that Johnny Carson could be trying to smear him with mafia-oriented innuendo.
In a recent report by correspondent Ira Silverman on "NBC Nightly News," Newton
was accused of having a cozy relationship with reputed mobster Guido Penosi. The Ross-
Silverman story said Newton sought Penosi's "assistance" in buying the scandal-scarred
Aladdin Hotel in Vegas for $85 million. The sale went through and, according to NBC,
the New York Mafia family of Carlo Gambino became a silent partner in the deal.
An angry Newton denies the charges, admitting only that he went to Penosi for help
when Newton's 4-year-old daughter had become the target of unspecified threats. He's
talking about suing NBC for "slander, defamation of character and everything else." And
he calls the Ross-Silverman report "the most blatant abuse of national press I have ever
seen." But Newton, whose voice fmally changed about 10 years ago, may have stubbed
his toe by uttering Johnny Carson's name. According to Newton, Carson probably had
something to do with the NBC report.
That's nonsense, of course. It's true that Carson once wanted to buy the Aladdin and
that he was muscled aside by Newton's investment group. It's also true that Johnny pokes
a lot of fun at Newton during his "Tonight Show" monologues.
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prospective plaintiff may request that the publisher retract the
statements." The demand for retraction, which usually takes the
form of a letter, is a means by which an allegedly defamed party
can make a formal objection to the publisher of the defamatory
language." This demand must specify the statements which are
believed to be libelous, as well as request the publisher of such
material to make public amends for its libel." Once the publisher
However, to link Carson's professional and personal distaste for Newton with a
straight news report that's admittedly damaging to the singer's image is pretty stupid.
Reliable sources say if Newton opens his trap once more about this absurd "Carson
connection, he'll wind up on the receiving end of a lawsuit.
Complaint, Carson Wayne Newton v. NBC, et al, U.S.D.C., District of Nevada, #CV-LV '81-180
HEC, exhibit J (1981) [herinafter Complaint].
9. CAL. CiV. CODE § 48a(1) (West 1984). See infra notes 57-63 and accompanying text
(discussing a plaintiffs duty to demand a retraction under California Civil Code section 48a).
10. See infra notes 11, 61, 157 (giving examples of the form and content of demands for
retractions from litigated cases).
11. CAL. Civ. CODE § 48a(1) (West 1984). The following is an example of how a demand
for retraction is tailored to the allegedly defamatory language within the article in question. In reply
to the previously reproduced article, attorneys for Wayne Newton served the following demand:
[To: San Diego Evening Tribune]
November 7, 1980
Re: Demand for Publication of Correction
Gentlemen:
On or about October 24, 1980, the San Diego Evening Tribune published an article
concerning our client Wayne Newton, entitled "The messy Newton-Carson feud: Singer
may be inviting suit," [sic] a copy of which is attached hereto. Said story was and is
untrue and libelous in that said publication, among other things:
I. Describes Wayne Newton as "slimy" and, in the context of the article, clearly
alleges, asserts, and/or implies that Mr. Newton is a man of ill-repute and has business
and personal relationships with the "Mob" or "Mafia;" and
2. Describes Mr. Newton as "stupid" in connection with certain statements
regarding Johnny Carson.
This publication has caused and will continue to cause Mr. Newton significant injury
on both a personal and business level. Therefore, demand is hereby made, pursuant to law
including, but not limited to, California [Civil] Code Section 48a, that you immediately
publish a correction of said article in substantially as conspicuous a manner as was the
above-stated article, and that in the article of correction, you state:
1. That Wayne Newton is not "slimy," is not a man of ill-repute, and that he does
not have either a business or personal relationship with the "Mob" or "Mafia;" and
2. That Wayne Newton is not stupid insofar as he claims involvement by Mr. Carson
in the so-called NBC report.
This notice and demand is being served upon you within twenty days of knowledge
of said publication.
[signed: attorneys for Wayne Newton]
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has received a demand for retraction, the publisher usually
investigates the veracity of its allegedly defamatory publication,
and then decides whether or not it is appropriate to issue a
retraction.12 If issued, the retraction, which can take the form of
a newspaper article or radio broadcast, depending on the
publisher's medium of communication, enables the publisher to
publicly admit that it made a mistake, or that it did not intend to
defame the injured party."
When complied with, the statutory requirements governing
demands and retractions may prove beneficial to all parties.
Retractions vindicate injured parties, and facilitate the recapture of
the parties' prior reputation because a reader of a retraction is
likely to have also read the allegedly libelous publication.14 The
publisher, although admitting error, is able to significantly diminish
the scope of its liability in the event that the injured party decides
to commence a defamation suit.15
Despite the relatively straight-forward wording of section 48a,
many defamation actions involve a dispute regarding a party's
failure to comply with the rules governing demand and
retraction.' 6 This Comment will illustrate how one "simple"
mechanism of California's retraction statute is subject to wide-
ranging and complex interpretation.
A source of considerable controversy under section 48a is
whether a retraction, if printed or broadcast, appears in
Complaint, supra note 8, at exhibit J (emphasis added). No retractions were published by the time
the complaint was filed. Id. at pam. 17. See infra notes 60-61 and accompanying text (discussing the
extent of the demand specificity requirements). See also infra notes 151-170 and accompanying text
(discussing the holding in Games v. Fried, 136 Cal. App. 3d 924, 186 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1982), which
states that the judge is allocated the task of determining whether or not the demand meets the rigors
of section 48a).
12. See infra notes 64-70 and accompanying text (describing the responses of a publisher to
the receipt of a demand for retraction).
13. See infra notes 87, 126, 137 and accompanying text (describing and giving examples of
retractions).
14. Magnetti, "In The End Truth Will Out"... Or Will It, 52 Mo. L REv. 299, 346-47
(1987).
15. See CAL CIv. CODE § 48a(1) (West 1984) (stating that a properly published retraction
excuses a publisher from all but special damages).
16. See infra notes 71-170 and accompanying text (discussing the controversies arising under
section 48a as found in several reported cases).
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"substantially as conspicuous a manner" as the original
defamatory statements. 17 Since the publication of a conspicuous
retraction can shield a publisher from a significant. portion of
liability,18 both parties to a libel suit have a profound incentive to
litigate the issue of compliance with this aspect of section 48a.
While the importance of conformity with section 48a's
conspicuousness standard is undisputed, a debate exists over
whether the judge or the jury should apply this standard to the facts
of a particular case.19 The Sixth and Second California Appellate
districts have held that the question of conspicuousness is one of
fact for the jury;2" however, there is no controlling statewide
authority because the California Supreme Court has not ruled on
this issue. In support of their holdings, the two appellate courts
have traced the development of California retraction law and
determined that a jury-based approach corresponds with the limited
past precedents. Despite the holdings of these two California
districts, several noteworthy arguments can be advanced in support
of the proposition that the judge should decide the conspicuousness
issue as a matter of law. These contentions include: the traditional
role of the judge as interpreter of documents, 21 out of state
authority empowering the judge to decide the conspicuousness
17. See infra notes 76-143 and accompanying text (explaining the conspicuousness standard
as well as the analysis under the standard).
18. See infra notes 65-69 and accompanying text (examining the extent to which a publisher
may limit its liability when a retraction is published in as "substantially as conspicuous a manner"
as the original defamatory statements).
19. See infra notes 76-297 and accompanying text (analyzing the arguments advanced for and
against a judge or jury-based decision under section 48a).
20. See Pierce v. San Jose Mercury News, 214 Cal. App. 3d 1626,263 Cal. Rptr. 410 (1990);
Twin Coast Newspapers v. Superior Court, 208 Cal. App. 3d 656,256 Cal. Rptr. 310 (1989) (holding
that whether or not a retraction is published in substantially as conspicuous a manner as the
defamatory article is a question of fact for the jury to decide). See also infra notes 79-142 and
accompanying text (discussing the reasons underlying the holdings in Twin Coast and Pierce).
21. See infra notes 188-198 and accompanying text (analogizing the roles of a judge when
deciding on the sufficiency of a demand for retraction, as well as whether an article complies with
California Civil Code section 47(d)*s fair and true report privilege, to the role of a judge under
section 48a).
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issue,22 analogies to the judge's duties under commercial law,
23
and public policy considerations.24
This Comment will discuss California's retraction statute, Civil
Code section 48a, and assess whether the conspicuousness of a
retraction should be decided by a jury as a matter of fact or by a
judge as a matter of law. Part I provides a brief overview of the
common law approach to retractions as well as the basic
components of retraction statutes in other states.' Part II analyzes
and critically assesses the reasoning behind California appellate
court decisions which hold that the conspicuousness of a retraction
is a matter of fact for the jury.26 Finally, Part III considers issues
not discussed by the California courts which tend to bolster the
conclusion that the conspicuousness of the retraction should be a
matter of law for the judge.2
I. COMMON LAW AND STATUTORY DEVELOPMENT
Retractions are as old as the law of defamation. With its roots
in early common law, the form and impact of a retraction has
undergone dramatic changes in its progression towards its present
form. While this Comment will discuss the modern statutory
approach to retractions, an understanding of the usage of the
retraction at common law is helpful.
22. See infra notes 201-221 and accompanying text (discussing Michigan and Minnesota case
law on the conspicuousness question).
23. See infra notes 231-254 and accompanying text (explaining the power of a judge to
determine whether language is conspicuous under the Uniform Commercial Code and comparing this
power with a judge's role under section 48a).
24. See infra notes 268-297 and accompanying text (discussing public policy reasons in favor
of a judge-based determination of conspicuousness in light of studies regarding the relative biases
of judges and juries).
25. See infra notes 28-34 and accompanying text (discussing retractions under the common
law and the statutes of other jurisdictions).
26. See infra notes 79-131, 142 and accompanying text (discussing the legal precedents cited
to support the holdings in Pierce v. San Jose Mercury News, 214 Cal. App. 3d 1626,263 Cal. Rptr.
410 (1990), and Twin Coast Newspapers v. Superior Court, 208 Cal. App. 3d 656, 256 Cal. Rptr.
310 (1989)).
27. See infra notes 268-297 and accompanying text (concluding that the at law approach
maximizes freedom of speech while enabling a fair adjudication of retraction issues).
1582
1992 / California Civil Code Section 48a
A. The Common Law Approach
At common law, retraction was a method used by a defendant
to mitigate damages resulting from a defamatory publication.28
While no legal duty to retract was imposed upon the publisher,29
damages could be reduced when the publisher issued a full and
prompt retraction. The sufficiency of the retraction was judged
in light of what a reasonable person would deem satisfactory under
the circumstances of the case.31 The presence or absence of a
retraction was also used as evidence of malice, a prerequisite to the
recovery of punitive damages in a defamation action.3 2 The extent
of mitigation achieved, if any, was an issue to be determined by
the trier of fact.33 Under modem law, the impact of a retraction
on a defamation suit is frequently determined by statute.'
28. KEETON ET AL, supra note 2, at 845-46 (5th ed. 1984). See also Murasky, Avoidable
Consequences In Defamation: The Common-Law Duty To RequestA Retraction, 40 RUTGERS L REV.
167 (1987) (calling for a return to common law principles which allowed a retraction to be used to
extinguish or mitigate damage claims).
29. Turner v. Hearst, 115 Cal. 394,403 (1896). See infra notes 85-93 and accompanying text
(discussing the facts and holding of Turner v. Hearst).
30. Turner, 115 Cal. at 402. The retraction had to be issued immediately to the extent that it
was explicitly linked to the defamatory remarks, or else the level of mitigation would diminish.
PROSSER & KEnTN, supra note 2, at 845-846 (citing Linney v. Maton, 13 Tex. 449 (1855); Trabue
v. Mays, 33 Ky. (3 Dana) 138 (1835)).
31. Turner, 115 Cal. at 404 (1896).
32. Id, at 401-02.
33. Id. at 402-04.
34. PRossER & KEETN, supra note 2, at 846.
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B. The Modem Statutory Approach
Currently, thirty-two states have some form of retraction
statute.35 Even though these statutes vary, there are several basic
components common to most retraction statutes.36 Like the
common law of retractions, most retraction statutes allow for
mitigation of damages, with the extent of reduction varying from
state to state.37 Upon publication of a sufficient retraction, some
states limit the plaintiff's recovery to special damages38 or actual
35. SANFORD, LmEL AND PRivACY app. B (2nd ed. 1991). See ALA. CODE §§ 6-5-184 to -186
(Supp. 1991); ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-653.01-.05 (1992); CAL. Civ. CODE § 48a (West 1984);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-237 (1991); FLA. STAT. §§ 770.01-.02 (1986); GA. CODE § 51-5-11 (1982
& Supp. 1991); IDAHO CODE § 6-712 (1990); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-4-14-1, -15-1 (West 1983);
IOWA CODE §§ 659.2-.3 (1987); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 411.051-.062 (Banks-Baldwin 1991); ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 153 (Supp. 1991); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 93 (West 1985);
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2911(2)(b) (West Supp. 1992); MINN. STAT. § 548.06 (1988); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 95-1-5 (1973); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-1-818 to -1-821 (1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-
840.01 (1989); NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 41.331-.338 (1991); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:43-2 (West 1987);
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 99-2 (1991); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02-08 (1991); Osuo REV. CODE ANN. §§
2739.13-.18, 2739.99 (1981); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1446a (West 1980); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.155-
.175 (1988); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. §§ 20-11-7 to -11-8 (Michie 1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-
24-103 (1980); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5431 (Vernon 1958); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 45-2-1,
45-2-1.5 (1988); VA. CODE §§ 58.1-46 to -48 (1980); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.58.040 (West 1988);
W. VA. CODE § 57-2-4 (1966); WIs. STAT. 895.05(2) (West 1985). See SANFORD, supra, at app. B
(reprinting the full text of the above listed retraction statutes).
36. Magnetti, supra note 14, at 346.
37. SANFORD, supra note 35, at 593.
38. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.336 (1991), N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02-08 (1991), WiS. STAT.
ANN. § 895.05 (West 1983) (stating that a statutorily sufficient retraction alleviates a publisher from
liability for all but special damages). California defines 'special damages" within the language of
its own retraction statute. CAL. CIV. CODE § 48a(4)(b) (West 1984). See infra note 54 (listing the full
text of California Civil Code section 48a, including the definition of special damages). Under section
48a, it is almost impossible for a public figure plaintiff to prove special damages. Grillo v. Smith 144
Cal. App. 3d 868, 873 n.2, 193 Cal. Rptr. 414, 417 n.2 (1983). Black's Law Dictionary, defines
special damages as:
Those which are the actual, but not the necessary, result of the injury complained of, and
which in fact follow it as a natural and proximate consequence in the particular case, that
is, by reason of special circumstances or conditions. [cite omitted] Such are damages
which do not arise from the wrongful act itself, but depend on circumstances peculiar to
the infliction of each respective injury.
BLAcK'S LAw DICToNARY 392 (5th ed. 1990). See Comment, Libel Per Se: Necessity ofAlleging
and Proving Special Damages in Libel Suits, 14 CAL. L REv. 61 (1925) (discussing early common
law treatment of damages in libel and slander actions with emphasis on libel per se and special
damages).
1584
1992 / Califomia Civil Code Section 48a
damages,39 while other states merely prohibit punitive damages.'
39. See MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 231, § 93 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1985) (limiting the plaintiffs'
recovery to actual damages upon a sufficient retraction). Black's Law Dictionary defines actual
damages as:
Real, substantial and just damages, or the amount awarded to a complainant in
compensation for his actual and real loss or injury, as opposed on the one hand to
'nominal' damages, and on the other to 'exemplary' or 'punitive' damages. Synonymous
with 'compensatory damages' and with 'general damages.'
BLACK'S LAW DICTIoNARY 390 (6th ed. 1990).
40. ALA. CODE § 6-5-185 - 186 (Supp. 1991); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-237 (West 1991). See
Sanford, supra note 35, at 593-95 (2nd ed. 1991) (discussing the differing levels of mitigation
allowed by state retraction statutes). Some states have retraction statutes which limit punitive damages
only in cases where the defendant published the defamatory article as a result of a good faith mistake.
Id. These statutes have been made obsolete by the United States Supreme Court's decision in Gertz
v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974). Id The Gertz court held that, in a matter of public interest,
punitive damages could not be awarded unless it was proven that the defendant knew of the
statement's falsity or acted with reckless disregard for the truth. Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S.
323, 349 (1974). See generally Gertz, Gertz on Gertz : Reflections on the Landmark Libel Case, 21
ThAL 66 (Oct. 1985) (evaluating the Gertz ruling from the perspective of a practicing trial lawyer
and giving litigation advise to defamation attorneys); Couzzi, Private Lives and Public Concerns: the
Decade Since Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 51 BROoKLYN L. REV. 425 (1985) (analyzing state courts'
application of a post-Gertz negligence standard and advocating adoption of the approach specified
in the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (SFcoND) section 580B Comment h) (1965); Smith, The Rising Tide
of Libel Litigation: Implications of the Gertz Negligence Rule, 44 MoNT. L. REV. 71 (1983) (arguing
that the vagueness of the Gertz negligence standard has caused an increase in lawsuits and fostered
media self-censorship); LaRue, Living with Gertz: a Practical Look at Constitutional Libel Standards,
67 VA. L. REv. 287 (1981) (explaining the practical problems of applying Gertz's constitutional
standards to state tort law claims); Comment, Defamation and State Constitutions: the Search for a
State Law Based Standard After Gertz, 19 Wnu.MLmE L. REv. 665 (1983) (analyzing the
application of Gertz in light of state constitutional provisions and using the Oregon constitution to
frame a model state approach to Gertz); McNulty, The Gertz Fault Standard and the Common Law
of Defamation: an Argumentfor Predictability of Result and Certainty of Expectation, 35 DRAKE L
REv. 51 (1986) (examining Gertz in lightofDun & Bradstreetv. Greenmoss Builders and contending
that the Dun & Bradstreet decision failed to establish a rule of broad applicability which was needed
to clarify Gertz); Comment, Accommodation of Reputational Interests and Free Press: a Call for a
Strict Interpretation of Gertz, 11 FORDiHAM URB. LJ. 401 (1982/1983) (examining the development
of constitutional defamation law and arguing that the current state of the law is deferent to the
media's interests at the expense of the individual's reputation); Collins & Drushal, Reaction of the
State Courts to Gertz v. Robert Welch, 28 CASE W. Rs. L Rev. 306 (1978) (analyzing state courts'
interpretation of the Gertz standard and emphasizing state' handling of questions left open after
Gertz); Robertson, Defamation and the First Amendment: In Praise of Gertz v. Robert Welch, 54
TEx. L REv. 199 (1976) (addressing criticisms of the Gertz decision and concluding that Gertz
strikes a proper balance between free speech and reputational interests); Brosnahan, From Times v.
Sullivan to Gertz v. Welch, Inc: Ten Years of Balancing Libel Law and the First Amendment, 26
HASTINs LJ. 777 (1975) (tracing the development of constitutional decisions regarding defamation
while emphasizing Gertz's effect on the holding in New York Times v. Sullivan). The United States
Supreme Court limited the applicability of the Gertz punitive damages rule to defamatory statements
involving matters of public concern in Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders. 105 S. Ct. 2939
(1985). The Court summarized the public concern test in the following broad language: "Whether
1585
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In some jurisdictions, a plaintiff's demand for retraction is a
condition precedent to the recovery of punitive damages, whereas
other states completely prohibit an action for defamation unless a
retraction demand is tendered.4"
The scope and coverage of retraction statutes also varies. Some
statutes are applicable only to newspapers, while others include
radio and television broadcasts.42 Most retraction statutes require
a plaintiff to request a retraction, and the defendant to publish a
retraction within specified time periods.43  The form of the
... speech addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by content, form, and context
... as revealed by the whole record." Id. at 2949 (quoting Connickv. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48
(1983)). Thus, under Dun & Bradstreet, state statutes which permit a retraction to bar recovery of
punitive damages only when the defendant has committed a good faith mistake would not be obsolete
if the mistake did not involve a "matter of public concern." See SMoLLA, THE LAw OF DEFANATION
§§ 3.02-.05 (5th ed. 1992) [hereinafter LAw oF DEFAMATIONI] (summarizing the Dun & Bradstreet
decision and its impact on the Gertz punitive damages rule as well as the media/non-media distinction
in defamation cases); Smolla, Dun & Bradstreet, Hepps, and Liberty Lobby: a new analytic Primer
on the future course of Defamation, 75 GEo. U.J. 1519, 153548 (1987) (articulating the holding in
Dun & Bradstreet in light of current constitutional doctrine and probable future changes in the law);
Lewis, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc, Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, and
Speech on Matters of Public Concern: New Directions in First Amendment Defamation Law, 20 IND.
L. REv. 767, 768-78, 782-92 (1987) (discussing the Dun & Bradstreet and the difficulty faced by
lower courts when assessing whether something is a matter of public concern); Drechsel, Defining
"Public Concern" In Defamation Cases Since Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 43 FED.
COMm. LJ. 1 (1990) (analyzing lower court decisions employing the Dun & Bradstreet "public
concern" standard and arguing that the Dun & Bradstreet decision has not yet narrowed the first
amendment protection accorded the media as originally feared); Estlund, Speech On Matters Of
Public Concern: The Perils Of An Emerging First Amendment Category, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1 (1990) (analyzing the origin and extent of the public concern tests enumerated in the United States
Supreme Court decisions of Dun & Bradstreet and Connick v. Meyers and arguing that the emergence
of the public concern test may undermine irst amendment protection); Comment, Dun & Bradstreet
v. Greenmoss: Cutting Away the Protective Mantle of Gertz, 37 HASTINas L J. 1171, 1180-96 (1986)
(criticizing the uncertain definition of public concern enunciated in Dun & Bradstreet and
recommending a return to the Gerz standard for all actions brought by private figure plaintiffs);
Comment, The Evolution ofa Public Issue: New York Times Through Grecnmoss, 57 U. COLO. L.
REV. 773, 785-91 (1986) (criticizing the holding in Dun & Bradstreet because it lays the foundation
for a return to pre-New York Times v. Sullivan defamation analysis). Other state statutes provide that
a retraction is merely evidence to be used by the jury to mitigate damages, which is a codification
of the common law principle. SANFORD, supra note 35, at 592.
41. Id. at 594-95.
42. Id. at 595-96. Several states impose special requirements when the defamation concerns
a candidate for public office. Id
43. Id at 594. Depending on the jurisdiction, the defendant may have between seventy-two
hours and three weeks to publish a retraction. IL See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-653.02 (1992),
IDAHO CODE § 6-712 (1990), NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-840.01 (1989) (providing that a retraction must
be published within three weeks); ALA. CODE § 6-5-185 (1977), N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99-2(a) (1991),
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published or broadcast retraction is subject to various sufficiency
requirements. Some states impose specific form requirements, such
as size and language, while others, like California, merely set a
basic standard from which the retraction is to be judged."
C. The California Retraction Statute
The development of California Civil Code section 48a can be
divided into three overlapping stages. The first stage is the
legislature's enactment of section 48a, which provided the rough
framework for today's law.45 The emergence of the "substantially
as conspicuous" language in the 1945 amendment to the retraction
statute, which serves as the basis for this Comment's analysis,
comprises the second stage in the development of section 48a.
46
The final interval of section 48a's evolution has been shaped by
TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-24-103(b)(1) (1980) (stating that the retraction must be published within ten
days); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.337 (1991) (stating that a retraction must be published within 20 days);
GA. CODE ANN. § 51-5-11 (Supp. 1991) (stating that a retraction must be published within 7 days).
Some states reject specific time frames for a retraction to be printed in favor of a standard which
requires publication within a "reasonable time.'" SANFORD, supra note 35, at 596-97. See CoNN. GEN
STAT. ANN. § 52-237 (West 1991), ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 153 (West 1980 & Supp. 1991),
MASs. ANN. LAWs ch. 231, § 93 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1985) (requiring that the publisher issue a
retraction within a reasonable time after receiving notice from the allegedly defamed plaintiff).
Montana's correction statute designates one week as being a statutorily reasonable time for the
correction to be issued. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-819 (1990).
44. SANFoED, supra note 35, at 596-97 (2nd ed. 1991). Some statutes require that the
retraction meet certain type size guidelines. Id For example, Minnesota's retraction statute requires
that the newspaper publish the correction under the heading "retraction," which must be printed in
at least 18 point type, and on the same page that the allegedly defamatory article originally appeared.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 548.06 (West 1988). See also OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §1446a-1446b (West
1980) (providing the same type size and placement requirements as found in Minnesota); MicH.
COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.2911(2)(b) (West 1986 & Supp. 1992) (specifying that the retraction must
be published in the same type size and editions as the original article). A retraction statute may
roughly outline what the publisher must say in regard to the allegedly defamatory remarks. SANFoRn,
supra note 35, at 596. Oregon Revised Statute § 30.165(3) states: "The correction or retraction shall
consist of a statement by the publisher substantially to the effect that the defamatory statements
previously made are not factually supported and that the publisher regrets the original publication
thereof." OR. REv. STAT. § 30.165 (1988). See also infra notes 55-70 and accompanying text
(discussing the standard set forth in Califomia's retraction statute).
45. See infra notes 48-54 and accompanying text (printing and discussing the scope of the
1931 version of section 48a).
46. See infra notes 55-70 and accompanying text (explaining the language and scope of the
modem version of section 48a).
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judicial decisions which have limited the scope of section 48a's
applicability.47
1. The Early Development of Civil Code § 48a
In 1931, California's first retraction statute, which applied only
to newspapers, was added to the Civil Code.48 Section 48a made
the amount of recovery of damages in defamation actions
contingent on certain actions by both the plaintiff and the defendant
newspaper. In a lawsuit where the defamatory publication was
proved to be the -result of misinformation or mistake, the plaintiff's
recovery was limited to actual damages unless a demand for
retraction was tendered and rejected.5" The demand had to be
served on the publisher at its place of business and was required to
specify the statements alleged to be libelous." Once served, the
publisher had two weeks to publish a retraction or correction "in
as conspicuous a place or type" as the original article appeared. 2
If a proper retraction was published and the defendant proved that
the initial defamatory article was published due to a good faith
47. See infra notes 71-75 and accompanying text (discussing the holding in Burnett v.
National Enquirer).
48. 1931 Cal. Stat. ch. 1018, section 1, at 2034 (enacting CAL. CIV. CODE section 48a). The
statute read:
48a. In any action for damages for the publication of a libel in a newspaper, if the
defendant can show that such libelous matter was published through misinformation or
mistake, the plaintiff shall recover no more than actual damages, unless a retraction be
demanded and refused as hereinafter provided. Plaintiff shall serve upon the publisher at
the place of publication a notice specifying the statements claimed to be libelous, and
requesting that the same be withdrawn.
If a retraction or correction thereof be not published in as conspicuous a place and
type in said newspaper as were the statements complained of, in a regular issue thereof
published within two weeks after such service, plaintiff may allege such notice, demand,
and failure to retract in his complaint and may recover both actual, special and exemplary
damages if his cause of action be maintained. If such retraction be so published, he may
still recover such actual, special, and exemplary damages, unless the defendant shall show
that the libelous publication was made in good faith, without malice, and under a mistake
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mistake as to the facts, the plaintiff's recovery was limited to




54. 1945 Cal. Stat. ch. 1489, section 5, at 2763-64 (amending CAL. CIV. CODE section 48a).
Section 48a of the Civil Code reads, in its entirety, as follows:
§ 48a Libel in newspaper, slander by radio broadcast
1. SPECIAL DAMAGES NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR CORRECTON. In any action for
damages for the publication of a libel in a newspaper, or of a slander by radio broadcast,
plaintiff shall recover no more than special damages unless a correction be demanded and
be not published or broadcast, as hereinafter provided. Plaintiff shall serve upon the
publisher, at the place of publication or broadcaster at the place of broadcast, a written
notice specifying the statements claimed to be libelous and demanding that the same be
corrected. Said notice and demand must be served within 20 days after knowledge of the
publication or broadcast of the statements claimed to be libelous.
2. GE A , SPECIAL AND EX ELARY DAMAGES. If a correction be demanded within
said period and be not published or broadcast in substantially as conspicuous a manner
in said newspaper or on said broadcasting station as were the statements claimed to be
libelous, in a regular issue thereof published or broadcast within three weeks after such
service, plaintiff, if he pleads and proves such notice, demand and failure to correct, and
if his cause of action be maintained, may recover general, special and exemplary damages;
provided that no exemplary damages may be recovered unless the plaintiff shall prove that
defendant made the publication or broadcast with actual malice and then only in the
discretion of the court or jury, and actual malice shall not be inferred or presumed from
the publication or broadcast.
3. CoR EcrioN PRIOR TO DEmAND. A correction published or broadcast in substantially
as conspicuous a manner in said newspaper or on said broadcasting station as the
statements claimed in the complaint to be libelous, prior to receipt of a demand therefor,
shall be of the same force and effect as though such correction had been published or
broadcast within three weeks after a demand therefor.
4. DEFjNMONs. As used herein, the terms "general damages," "special damages,"
-exemplary damages" and "'actual malice," are defined as follows:
(a) "'General damages" are damages for loss of reputation, shame,
mortification and hurt feelings;
(b) "Special damages" are all damages which plaintiff alleges and proves that he
has suffered in respect to his property, business, trade, profession or occupation, including
such amounts of money as the plaintiff alleges and proves he has expended as a result of
the alleged libel, and no other,
(c) "Exemplary damages" are damages which may in the discretion of the court or
jury be recovered in addition to general and special damages for the sake of example and
by way of punishing a defendant who has made the publication or broadcast with actual
malice;
(d) "Actual malice" is that state of mind arising form hatred or ill will toward the
plaintiff; provided, however, that such a state of mind occasioned by a good faith belief
on the part of the defendant in the truth of the libelous publication or broadcast at the time
it is published or broadcast shall not constitute actual malice.
Id (emphasis added). See Reuben, Use Of The Cahfornia Correction Statute In Defense Of Media
And Entertainment Clients: Pitfalls and Problems, 19 BEvERLY Hnu B. L 170 (1985) (explaining
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2. "Substantially as Conspicuous"
As revised, section 48a broadens the scope and impact of a
retraction and specifies several form and substance requirements
absent in the original law.55 To keep pace with the technology of
the time, the retraction statute was expanded to include radio
broadcasts as well as newspaper articles.5" Under the current
version of section 48a, in an action for defamation a plaintiff must
serve upon the defendant a demand for correction within twenty
days from the discovery of the allegedly defamatory remarks.57 A
plaintiff who fails to make a timely request for correction will be
limited to recovery of only special damages.58 Since special
damages are hard to prove, and amount to a very small percentage
of overall libel damages, plaintiffs suing for solely monetary gain
the mechanics and practical uses of Section 48a in the defense of media clients).
55. See Comirnent, Libel & Slander, 19 S. CAI. L. REV. 119, 124-26 (1945) (comparing the
1931 and 1945 versions of California Civil Code section 48a in anticipation of potential constitutional
challenges). The constitutionality of section 48a's limitation of damages, as amended, was upheld by
the California Supreme Court in an opinion by Justice Traynor. Werner v. Southern California
Associated Newspapers, 35 Cal. 2d 121,216 P.2d 825 (1950). The Werner court held that California
Constitution article I, § 9, which stated that individuals are responsible for their abuse of freedom of
speech, "does not confer upon a defamed person a right to remedy of damages." Id at 124, 216 P.2d
at 827. The Werner court rejected the appellant's federal due process claim by concluding that
limitation of a plaintiff's damages was a constitutionally permissible objective. Id. at 125-26, 216
P.2d at 828. The court made note of two of the legislature's policy goals:
There are at least two bases on which the Legislature could reasonably conclude that the
retraction provisions of section 48a provide a reasonable substitute for general damages
in actions for defamation against newspapers and radio stations, namely, the danger of
excessive recoveries of general damages in libel actions and the public interest in the free
dissemination of news.
Id at 126, 216 P.2d at 828. See Simon, Libel: Retraction: Effect of Recent California Legislation,
38 CALiF. L REv. 951 (1950) (critiquing California's retraction statute in light of the constitutional
challenge of Werner v. Southern Calfornla Associated Newspapers and practical problems of the
statute's application); Note, Libel and Slander: Mitigation of Damages-Constitutionality and Scope
of Newspaper Libel Retraction Statute, 2 HAsTiNos L. J. 75 (1951) (describing the impact of Werner
on saction 48a and suggesting that the statute be re-amended to conform to the 1931 version).
56. CAL. CrV. CODE § 48a(1) (West 1984).
57. Id
58. Id See id § 48a(4)(b) (West 1984) (definition of special damages). See also supra note
59 and accompanying text (describing the difficulties of recovering special damages in a libel suit).
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will have little incentive to do so when limited to special
damages. 9 The demand for correction must be in writing, and
must specify the allegedly libelous statements which are sought to
be corrected.60 If the demand does not specifically request a
retraction in accordance with the requirements of section 48a, the
plaintiff's recovery may be limited to special damages. 61 The
sufficiency of the demand for retraction is decided by the judge as
a matter of law.62 Service of the demand must be to the publisher
or broadcaster at the place of publication or broadcast.6 Upon
59. SMOJ.A, Sumo Ta Panss 108 (1986) [hereinafter SuiNG Tm PREss]. Despite the proof
difficulties, certain types of libel actions are well-suited to recover special damages. id For example,
the false and defamatory statement that a doctor is a -quack" may hurt the doctor's medical practice
and facilitate the recovery of special damages. Id Evidence of emotional distress and psychic injury
may be utilized to prove special damages when others' awareness of defamatory remarks has
impacted the plaintiff's business income. O'Hara v. Storer Communications, Inc., 231 Cal. App. 3d
1101, 1113-16, 282 Cal. Rptr. 712,719-21 (1991).
60. CAL Civ. CODE § 48a(1) (West 1984).
61. Farr v. Bramblet, 132 Cal. App. 2d 36, 44, 281 P.2d 372, 377 (1955). The Farr court
found the following demand insufficient for purposes of section 48a:
[C]onsequenty an opportunity will be afforded and demand is made upon you
individually and as a member of the Bramblet Committee that you or your representative
meet in our office before five P.M. today November 3rd to arrange full details of
immediate and satisfactory and full retraction of these false and libelous statements.
Failing this, immediate proceedings will be initiated.
l at 40, 281 P.2d at 375. The defendant in Farr did not attend the meeting and legal action was
instituted the day after the telegram was received. Il The court held that the plaintiff's summons of
the defendant to a meeting as well as the institution of legal action before the three weeks allowed
for a retraction under the statute made it reasonable for the defendant to believe that "no demand
under section 48a was intended." Id at 44,281 P.2d at 377. In Harris v. Curtis Publishing, the court
found the following demand inadequate under section 48a:
No mere retraction, therefore, for a statement of this kind could possibly atone for the
outrage committed by such unwarranted publication. I am instructed by Mr. Harris to say
that unless proper and substantial compensation is made by you, that he will appeal to the
courts for satisfaction and vindication.
49 Cal. App. 2d 340, 354, 121 P.2d 761, 768-69 (1942). The Harris case was decided under 1931
Cal Stat. ch. 1098, section 1, at 2034. See supra note 48 (printing the 1931 version of California
Civil Code § 48a).
62. See Gomes v. Fried, 136 Cal. App. 3d 924, 935-36, 186 Cal. Rptr. 605, 611-12 (1982)
(holding that the presence of undisputed facts and public policy considerations dictate that the judge
should determine the sufficiency of a demand for retraction). See infra notes 151-70 and
accompanying text (discussing the facts and full implications of the Gomes decision).
63. CAL. Civ. CODE § 48a(l) (West 1984).
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receipt of the demand, the publisher has three weeks to publish a
retraction."
Under the amended section 48a, the retraction must be
published or broadcast in "substantially as conspicuous a manner"
as were the original defamatory remarks.65 As under the original
version, the revised retraction statute is silent in regard to whether
the judge or jury should decide the conspicuousness issue." The
retraction must also appear in a regular edition or scheduled
broadcast. 7 A newspaper or radio station which makes an
insufficient retraction or fails to retract at all may be liable for
special, general, and exemplary damages." Furthermore, an
evasive and incomplete retraction may be considered by the jury as
evidence supporting an award of punitive damages.' The burdens
of pleading and proof are allocated to the plaintiff in regard to
notice, demand, and failure to correct.7"
3. Section 48a's Limited Applicability: the Impact of Burnett
v. National Enquirer
Section 48a specifically refers to newspapers and radio stations,
and California courts have narrowly interpreted this section to
exclude all magazines.7 In Carol Burnett v. National Enquirer,
72
64. 1, § 48a(2) (West 1984). A newspaper or radio station may preemptively retract a
statement absent a demand, and such retraction, if sufficient, will be accorded with the same weight
as if it were requested. IL § 48a(3) (West 1984).
65. Id § 48a(1) (West 1984). The addition of "substantially as conspicuous" replaced the "in
as conspicuous a place or type" language of the original version of section 48a. 1931 Cal. Stat. oh.
1018, section 1, at 2034. See supra notes 55-75 and accompanying text (stating the rest of the
statutory requirements of section 48a).
66. CAL. CIV. CODE § 48a (West 1984).
67. l
68. Id. § 48a(2) (West 1984). General damages are the major component of jury awards in
defamation suits. SUr THE PRESS, supra note 59, at 108. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 48a(4)(a) (West
1984) (defining of general damages); § 48a(c) (West 1984) (defining of exemplary damages).
69. Burnett v. National Enquirer, 144 Cal. App. 3d 991,1012,193 Cal. Rptr. 206,219 (1983).
70. CAL. Civ. CODE § 48a(2) (West 1984).
71. Burnett, 144 Cal. App. 3d at 1002-04, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 211-13. See Comment, What Is
a "fewspaper" Under California's Retraction Statute? Enquiring Minds Want to Know, 10
IHASTnGS COMM/ENT L. L 795 (1988) (discussing the problems associated with California courts'
interpretation of -newspaper" under section 48a and proposing a new and more definite standard);
Schwarzbach, Shouldn't California's Retraction Statute Protect Magazines Too?, 18 Sw. U.L REV.
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the California Court of Appeal for the Second District held that the
National Enquirer was not a newspaper within the meaning of
section 48a, and, therefore, could not claim the protection of the
retraction statute. 3 After stating that the type of information
printed in the Enquirer made it far less subject to the time and
accuracy constraints, such as daily deadlines and late-breaking
news that are inherent to the publication of newspapers, the
California court allowed recovery of punitive damages despite a
retraction.74 According to one commentator, section 48a's
exclusion of magazines may violate the Equal Protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, although no recent case has challenged
the retraction statute's constitutionality.7 5
197,203-11 (1989) (examining California cases holding that section 48a does not apply to magazines
and recommending that the California legislature amend section 48a to include magazines); SUING
TH FREss, supra note 59, at 100-17 (discussing the trial and facts of Burnett as well as its legal
significance). See also O'Hara, 231 Cal. App. 3d at 1111, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 718 (applying section
48a's limitation to special damages as a result of a plaintiff's failure to make a sufficient demand for
correction regarding a television broadcast).
72. 144 Cal. App. 3d 991, 193 Cal. Rptr. 206 (1983).
73. id
74. Id. at 1004,193 Cal. Rptr. at 213. After reviewing previous California authority, the Court
of Appeals concluded:
[W]hat emerges as the view from the authorities discussed is the proposition that the
protection afforded by the statute is limited 'to those who engage in the immediate
dissemination of news on the ground that the Legislature could reasonably conclude that
such enterprises cannot always check their sources for accuracy and their stories for
inadvertent publication errors.
Id (citing Field Research Corp. v. Superior Court, 71 CaL 2d 110, 114,453 P.2d 747,77 Cal. Rptr.
243 (1969)). The necessity to publish news while it is fresh constrains a daily newspaper's ability
to verify the accuracy of all information before the publication deadline.
Id at 1001, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 211. The National Enquirer, which has a one to three week lead time
for its articles, does not endure the same time constraints and, hence, is not accorded protection by
section 48a. Id at 1000, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 210. See id. at 1000 n.3, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 210 n.3
(defining lead time as distinguished from deadline). Even if the Burnett court applied section 48a to
the National Enquirer, it is doubtful that the tabloid would have been able to limit its liability for
punitive damages. The court ruled that the Enquirer's retraction "was evasive, incomplete and by
any standard, legally insufficient." Id at 1012, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
75. LAW OF DEFAMATION § 9.1212][a] (1992). The argument is that once a state enacts a
retraction statute, the state has an obligation under the first amendment to treat all components of the
media equally and without regard to content, unless a compelling state interest justifies preferential
treatment to certain types of media formats. Id. It would be difficult to find a compelling interest in
differentiating newspapers and radio stations from magazines as a class because some magazines face
significant deadline pressures and publish "hot news" whereas some newspapers and broadcasters
are faced with relatively low deadline pressure for the bulk of their news output. Id Early equal
protection attacks against section 48a have failed; however, the intervening expansion of equal
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Before considering the allocation of decision-making powers
under the retraction statute, it would be helpful to understand how
conspicuousness issues arise in a defamation action. A hypothetical
best illustrates this process.
Assume that on Friday, June 5, 1992 the Metropolitan Free
Press published an article in its evening edition accusing a local
tavern owner, Johnny Future, of being involved in an international
white slavery ring. The article was printed on page three of the
front section under the headline, in eighteen point type, "WHITE
SLAVERY RING BUSTED." The sub-headline, in 14 point type,
read "Local Impresario May Face Indictment." The article stated,
in part, that reliable sources had indicated that Johnny Future
utilized the white slavery ring to provide cocktail waitresses and
busboys for his nightclub. Upon reading the article, Future
contacted his attorney, who, two days later, served a demand for
retraction on the Free Press's publisher. After investigation, the
publisher determined the accusations to be false, and printed a
retraction. On Wednesday, June 11, 1992, a retraction was
published in the evening edition of the Free Press which
unequivocally cleared Future of any involvement in the white
slavery syndicate. The retraction appeared on the back page of the
front section under the headline, in 18 point type, "SETTING THE
RECORD STRAIGHT." The sub-headline read, in 12 point type,
"Bar Owner Exonerated."
Unsatisfied with the retraction, Future filed suit for defamation
of character claiming general and exemplary damages. In response,
the Free Press filed for summary judgment arguing that since it
printed a retraction in compliance with section 48a, Future is barred
from recovering all but special damages. Since Future did not plead
special damages, the Free Press seeks dismissal of the claim.
Future then avers that given the fact that the retraction was printed
on a different page, with a different headline, and on a different
day of the week than the original defamatory article, the retraction
protection and first amendment law may make California's correction statute more at risk. Idc at
n.155. See supra note 55 (discussing the unsuccessful constitutional attack against section 48a in
Werner v. Southern California Associated Newspapers, 35 Cal. 2d 121, 216 Po2d 825 (1950)).
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was not printed in "as substantially as conspicuous a manner,"
and, therefore, the Free Press is not entitled to statutory protection.
It is at precisely this point in the litigation process that this
Comment will focus. Should the judge in the hypothetical case of
Future v. Metropolitan Free Press assess compliance with the
conspicuousness standard in light of the undisputed facts
encompassing the article and subsequent retraction? Or, should the
judge deny the summary judgment motion and allow the jury to
decide whether the Free Press retraction met statutory muster?
II. CASE LAW ADDRESSING WHETHER A JUDGE OR JURY
SHOULD DETERMINE THE CONSPICUOUSNESS
OF A RETRACTION
While section 48a enumerates specific guidelines that a plaintiff
and defendant in a defamation action must follow, the statute is
silent in at least one crucial area. California's retraction statute
requires a retraction to be published in "substantially as
conspicuous a manner" as the defamatory article,76 but it fails to
give any guidance concerning the appropriate decision maker under
this standard. The judiciary has attempted to fill in the statutory
silence, and two California courts of appeal have ruled that the
issue of whether a retraction was published in substantially as
conspicuous a manner as the original is a question of fact for the
jury to decide.77 These courts have arrived at their conclusion
based on an analysis of past judicial interpretations of section 48a,
as well as the role of the judge in other areas of defamation law.7"
76. CAL CIV. CODE § 48a(2) (West 1984).
77. See infra notes 100-143 and accompanying text (discussing the holding in Twin Coast and
Pierce).
78. See infra notes 109-131, 140-142 and accompanying text (explaining and analyzing the
rationales underlying the decisions in Twin Coast and Pierce).
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A. Conspicuousness as a Question of Fact for the Jury
"The precedents are sparse.", 79 Justice Fukuto's statement in
Twin Coast v. Superior Court" illustrates the quandary faced by
California courts when deciding whether conspicuousness should
be a matter of law for the judge, or a matter of fact for the jury.
Confronted with little guidance within California law, parties on
both sides of this issue have been forced to cite to out of state
authority and to draw analogies from other areas of defamation law
to support their conclusions."' This section will discuss the
reasons advanced to support the jury's determination of
conspicuousness as enumerated in the two most recent California
appellate court opinions on this topic, Twin Coast Newspapers v.
Superior Court2 and Pierce v. San Jose Mercury News.13 The
California Supreme Court issued its only decision on the
determination of a retraction's sufficiency in Turner v. Hearst,
84
a case decided in 1896.
1. Turner v. Hearst
In Turner, the San Francisco Examiner mistakenly implicated
the plaintiff as being involved in fraudulent activities.8 5 Following
notice of its error, the newspaper published a retraction. 6 At trial,
the Examiner claimed the existence of the retraction should be a
79. Twin Coast, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 659, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 311 (1989).
80. 208 Cal. App. 3d 656,256 Cal. Rptr. 310 (1989).
81. Pierce, 214 Cal. App. 3d at 1630-34, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 413-15 (1990); Twin Coast, 208
Cal. App. 3d at 659-62, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 311-13 (1989).
82. 208 Cal. App. 3d 656, 256 Cal. Rptr. 310 (1989).
83. 214 Cal. App. 3d 1626, 263 Cal. Rptr 410 (1989).
84. 115 Cal. 394 (1896).
85. Id. at 397-98. The person actually engaged in fraudulent activities was John H. Thomas.
L at 398. The reporter for the San Francisco Examiner transposed the names of Turner and John
Thomas in an attempt to 'boil it down- an article printed the previous day in the San Francisco
Post. Id. at 398. In reality, Turner was suing Thomas for fraud and false pretenses. Id at 397.
86. Id at 398. The record is unclear as to whether or not the retraction was published before
or after Turner initiated a lawsuit Id at 397-98.
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mitigating factor in assessing the plaintiff's damages.8 7 While
affirming the common law notion that a retraction may be used to
mitigate damages,8" the court held that the determination of a
retraction's sufficiency is uniquely a question of fact which lies
within the province of the jury."
Despite the fact that Turner is the highest authority on the
retraction issue, its holding does not restrict lower California courts
in determining the sufficiency of a retraction under section 48a.
90
Turner was decided under a common law scheme, where the jury
was first charged with assessing the total harm to the plaintiff, then
determining the degree of mitigation caused by the retraction.9'
Unlike Turner, a substantially as conspicuous retraction under
section 48a removes from the jury's consideration the issues of
general and exemplary damages.' Therefore, since section 48a
fundamentally alters the role of the jury to the extent that its
discretion is limited, the Turner decision does not control modem
retraction procedure.93
87. Id at 398. The retraction, which was printed almost two months after the libelous article,
stated:
It will thus be seen that we have unintentionally done Mr. Turner a great injustice, but one
which is likely to happen with the most carefully guarded attention to the news columns
of a busy morning paper. Such mistakes are always to be regretted, as is this, and call for
ample and prompt explanations, which we are always prepared to make. In this case we
should have been pleased to have set the matter-Mr. Turner and our own mistake-right at
an earlier day had the matter been sooner called to our attention.
IdL
88. See id at 402-04. See supra notes 28-51 and accompanying text (discussing the common
law use of a retraction to mitigate damages).
89. Turner, 115 Cal. at 402-03. The court did not elaborate on why the analysis of a
retraction's sufficiency is uniquely for the jury to decide. To be sufficient to claim mitigation of
damages, the court held that the retraction had to be "fully, fairly, and promptly made, and is such
as an impartial person would consider reasonable and satisfactory under the circumstances of the
case." Id at 404.
90. Twin Coast, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 660, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 311-12.
91. Id at 659-60, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 311-12. See Turner, 115 Cal. at 403-4 (stating that
publication of a retraction may be presented to the jury for mitigation purposes).
92. CAL. Cri. CODE § 48a(l)-(2) (West 1984).
93. Twin Coast, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 660,256 Cal. Rptr. at 312. The court characterized the
dissimilarities between the Turner and modem statutory approach:
This pronouncement is not controlling, however, for the 'sufficiency' of a retraction
had a different meaning at that time. The rule was that a retraction could be considered
in mitigation of damages (see 115 Cal. at p. 402, 47 P. at 129), and thus a jury in every
case involving a retraction was required to evaluate the extent to which the initial harm
1597
Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 23
2. The Impact of Section 48a on the Conspicuousness Issue
Since the adoption of section 48a in 1931, a few courts have
endeavored to interpret the statute's conspicuousness standard.
9 4
The following three subsections analyze three significant
interpretations of section 48a, and each interpretation's impact on
the current state of the law in regard to the relative roles of judge
and jury.
a. Behrendt v. Times-Mirror
The first case considering the conspicuousness issue under
section 48a was Behrendt v. Times-Mirror.95 Behrendt was
another case of mistaken identity where the Los Angeles Times
inadvertently implicated a doctor as being a narcotics thief and
addict.96 The newspaper printed a voluntary retraction, and later
followed it with a second retraction in response to the plaintiff's
demand. The plaintiff brought a successful action for libel, and,
on appeal, the newspaper contested the trial court's instruction
which charged the jury with the determination of the
conspicuousness of the retraction, and argued that the court was the
proper decision-maker." Holding that the retraction's sufficiency
entailed the comparison of numerous factual variables, such as
headlines, article location and type size, the Court of Appeal for
to the plaintiff's reputation was undone by the retraction.
With the enactment of section 48a in 1931, retractions assumed an additional
significance: publication of a retraction meeting the statutory standard eliminates liability
for specified types of damages.
Id. at 660, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 311-12. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 48a(1)-(2) (West 1984) (stating that a
jury may only consider special damages if a statutorily proper correction is made).
94. See infra notes 85-111. 132-142 and accompanying text (discussing California courts
interpretation of the conspicuous standard under both the 1931 and 1945 versions of section 48a).
95. 30 Cal. App. 2d 77, 85 P.2d 949 (1938).
96. Id. at 80-83, 85 P.2d at 950-51.
97. Id. at 82, 85 P.2d at 951. The voluntary retraction included a statement of the reasons for
the mistake in identity and was accompanied by a picture of the plaintiff. Id
98. Id at 88, 85 P.2d at 954.
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the Second District upheld the trial court's instruction, ruling that
the jury should determine the conspicuousness of retractions."
b. Twin Coast Newspapers v. Superior Court
In Twin Coast Newspapers v. Superior Court,x°° the Court of
Appeal for the Second District relied on the precedent set forth in
Behrendt."0 ' In Twin Coast, the Long Beach Press-Telegram
reported on a brutal attack against a six year-old child and the
murder of her mother."° The article, which appeared on the front
page, mistakenly implicated the plaintiff's daughter as being
arrested and booked on charges of murder.1 °3 In response to a
demand for retraction,' 04 the newspaper issued retractions on two
separate dates and also issued an "editor's note" explaining the
newspaper's mistake.0 5
Following the first printed retraction, a defamation suit was
filed against Twin Coast newspapers, owners of the Long Beach
Press-Telegram."6 The newspaper appealed from the denial of
summary judgment on the ground that the court was the proper
decision-maker to gauge the sufficiency of the retraction.'0 7
99. Id at 88-89, 85 P.2d at 954. The court explained that there were several variables to be
considered by the jury when comparing the retraction to the defamatory article, including the relative
locations of the retractions and the defamatory articles, the headline language and positioning, and
the use of boldface type. Id at 88, 85 P.2d at 954.
100. 208 Cal. App. 3d 656, 256 Cal. Rptr. 310 (1989).
101. Id at 660-61, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 312.
102. Id at 658-60, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 310-11.
103. IA at 659,256 Cal. Rptr. at 311. The article was published in both editions of the Long
Beach Press-Telegram on August 20, 1987. Id The headline read "6-year-old girl survives torching,
mother killed," and the sub-headline stated "McKinney preschool employee, man are booked for
murder."eLa
104. The demand for retraction was tendered on the day that the article was published. Id at
659, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 311.
105. Id at 659, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 311. The retractions were printed in both editions of the
newspaper on August 21 and September 10, 1987. Id The editor's note was in response to a letter
to the editor and was printed on September 7, 1987. Id The Long Beach Press-Telegram further
conceded its errant reporting in a September 4, 1987 news article discussing the plaintiff's filing of
a libel suit. Ida
106. Id
107. Id In the alternative, the defendant contended that even if the sufficiency was a question
for the jury, no issue of a material fact existed, and summary judgment was appropriate. Id
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Notwithstanding the fact that Behrendt was decided under the 1931
version of section 48a,10 8 the Twin Coast court held that the
change in statutory language from "as conspicuous a place and
type" to "substantially as conspicuous a manner" was not
fundamental enough to disturb Behrendt's holding that the jury
should decide the issue of conspicuousness."
Despite finding Behrendt controlling, the Twin Coast court felt
compelled to look to other jurisdictions to bolster its decision."'
The court cited several cases from other states and from federal
courts which held that the sufficiency of the retraction was a
question for the jury.'
One of the cases cited by the Twin Coast court was Sargent v.
National Broadcasting Company,"' where a federal court briefly
addressed the issue of retraction sufficiency." 3 The defamation
action stemmed from remarks made regarding the plaintiff during
an NBC program, which was broadcast on both radio and
television.' The defendant moved to dismiss the action on the
108. See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text (discussing the 1931 version of California
Civil Code section 48a).
109. Twin Coast at 660-61,256 Cal. Rptr. at 312. The primary impact of the 1945 amendment
to section 48a was the elimination of the good faith mistake requirement. See supra note 48
(providing the full text of the 1931 version of section 48a, including the good faith requirement).
Twin Coast 208 Cal. App. 3d at 660,256 Cal. Rptr. at 312. This change has no relevance to the issue
of the conspicuousness of the retraction. Id.
110. Id. at 661, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 312-13.
111. Twin Coast, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 661,256 Cal. Rptr. at 312-13. See Sargent v. National
Broadcasting Company, 136 F. Supp. 560,565 (1955) (interpreting section 48a as requiring the jury
to decide whether a retraction was conspicuous); Nevada Independent Broadcasting Corp. v. Allen,
99 Nev. 404, 405, 664 P.2d 337, 345 (1983) (holding that under a similar Nevada law the question
of a retraction's conspicuousness was to be decided by the jury); Brogan v. Passaic Daily News, 22
NJ. 139, 123 A.2d 473, 478 (1956); Knoxville Publishing Co. v. Taylor 31 Tenn. App. 368, 215
S.W.2d 27, 30 (1948); Lawrence v. Herald Publishing Co. 158 Mich. 459, 122 N.W. 1084, 1086
(1909) (holding that the sufficiency of a retraction is to be decided by the jury); Rudin v. Dow Jones
& Co., 510 F. Supp. 210, 217 (1981) (stating in dictum that there is support for a jury-based
approach to conspicuous determinations under section 48a).
112. 136 F. Supp. 560 (N.D. Cal. 1955).
113. 1,4 at 565. The federal court interpreted California law without making a binding
determination of whether California or New York substantive law would govern the dispute. Id at
564.
114. Id. at 562. The NBC program was entitled "American Forum" and originally aired on
August 8, 1954. Id. The alleged defamatory remarks were made by Congressman Wayne L. Hays
during a moderated discussion on the topic "Should Foundations Be Entitled To Tax Exemption. Id
The plaintiff alleged that the Congressman's remarks were defamatory to the extent that they
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grounds that the demand for retraction was insufficient and, in the
alternative, that it issued a sufficient retraction. I15 In ruling on the
defendant's motion, the court stated that the question of whether
the correction was sufficient under section 48a was a question of
fact for the jury.
1 16
The Twin Coast court next cited two other decisions which
briefly ruled on the issue of who is the proper decision-maker
regarding the conspicuousness of the retraction.117 In Nevada
Independent Broadcasting Corp. v. Allen,"' the plaintiff sued a
television station over allegedly defamatory remarks directed
toward him during a political debate." 9 The plaintiff and his
agent made demands for retraction in person and in writing, and
when the defendant's subsequent retraction did not satisfy the
plaintiff, a libel action was filed." The Nevada Supreme Court,
in refusing to overturn the trial verdict, held that the sufficiency of
both the demand for retraction and retraction are factual issues for
the determination of the jury. 21
portrayed him as engaging in unethical behavior and impropriety. a at 564.
115. Id at 564. The complaint and answer were in conflict as to whether a demand for
retraction was served, and if a retraction was in fact published. Id The appellate court found that the
plaintiff demanded a retraction which substantially complied with section 48a, but did not rule on
whether a sufficient retraction was broadcast. Id at 565.
116. Id at 565 (citing Scott v. Times-Mirror, 181 Cal. 345,184 P. 672 (1919)). Since the Scott
decision was decided prior to the enactment of section 48a, its precedential value is diminished for
the same reasons that the precedential value of Turner v. Hearst is diminished. See supra notes 90-93
and accompanying text (stating that the Turner common law approach is not binding precedent for
analysis of conspicuousness under section 48a).
117. Twin Coast, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 661, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 313 (citing Nevada Independent
Broadcasting Corp. v. Allen, 99 Nev. 404, 664 P.2d 337, 345 (1983); Rudin v. Dow Jones, 510 F.
Supp 210, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)).
118. 99 Nev. 404, 664 P.2d 337 (1983).
119. Id at 408, 664 P.2d at 340-41. The allegations included charges of bouncing checks,
insolvency, and dishonorable behavior. Id. at 408, 664 P.2d at 340-41.
120. Id at 408-09, 664 P.2d at 341.
121. Id at 416, 664 P.2d at 345. The jury is to decide the sufficiency issues by a preponderance
of the evidence. Id The Nevada Retraction statute is very similar to California's section 48a. NEV.
REV. STAT. §§ 41.331-41.338 (1985) The Nevada statute reads, in relevant part, as follows:
§ 41.336 SPECIAL DAMAGES; NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR CORRECrTION.
1. In any action for damages for the publication of a libel in a newspaper, or of a
slander by radio or television broadcast, the plaintiff may recover no more than special
damages unless a correction is demanded by the plaintiff and not published or broadcast.
2. A demand for correction shall be in writing and shall be served upon the
newspaper or broadcaster at its place of business. Such demand shall specify the
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The Twin Coast court also cited the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York's interpretation of section
48a in Rudin v. Dow Jones & Company.122 In that case, Barron's
Business and Financial Weekly published an article regarding the
questionable purchase by Frank Sinatra, and associates, of stock in
the Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Company.12 1 In response to the
column, Milton A. Rudin, an associate of Sinatra, wrote an open
letter to Barron's defending the investment, and Barron's published
the letter under the caption "SINATRA'S MOUTHPIECE.
12 4
Finding the caption libelous, Rudin demanded a retraction,125 and
Barron's subsequently issued a retraction.126 Nevertheless, Rudin
brought an action for defamation in federal district court.127 Dow
Jones, the owner of Barron's, moved to dismiss the case arguing,
statements claimed to be libelous or slanderous and shall demand a correction.
3. Such demand for correction must be served within 90 days after the plaintiff has
knowledge of the publication or broadcast of the statements claimed to be libelous or
slanderous.
§ 41.337 GENmEAL, SPECIAL AND EXEmPLARY DAMAGES
If a correction is demanded as provided in NRS 41.336 and is not published or
broadcast within 20 days in substantially as conspicuous a manner in the newspaper or
by the broadcaster as the statements claimed to be libelous or slanderous, the plaintiff
may plead and prove such demand and failure to correct and may recover general and
special damages. In addition, the plaintiff may recover exemplary damages if he can prove
that the defendant published or broadcast the statement with actual malice. Actual malice
shall not be presumed or inferred from the publication or broadcast.
Id (emphasis added). See id §§ 41.332-.335 (1985) (specifying Nevada definitions of actual malice,
exemplary damages, general damages, and special damages, for purposes of the retraction statute),
122. 510 F. Supp. 210 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
123. Id at 211-12. The article appeared in Barron's regular column entitled "Up & Down Wall
Street" and was published on page 37 of the November 27, 1978 issue. IX The article questioned
why Rudin and Sinatra, investors in casinos and hotels, would invest in a dredge and dock company.
Id
124. Id at 212. The letter was published in the "Barron's Mailbag" section and was published
on January 15, 1979. Id "SINATRA'S MOUTHPIECE" was printed above the letter in all capitals
and typeface slightly larger than that of the letter. Id
125. Id at 212. The retraction demand was sent via telegram on January 16, 1979, one day
following publication of Rudin's letter. Id The demand for retraction alleged that the caption
"SINATRA'S MOUTHPIECE" maligned his professional character and competency. Id
126. Id at 212. The retraction was printed as an editorial note at the beginning of the
"Barron's Mailbag," the same column that the allegedly defamatory caption appeared, on January
22, 1979. Id The retraction stated: "Milton Rudin, an attorney who represents Frank Sinatra, has
objected to our referring to him as 'Sinatra's Mouthpiece' in last week's Mailbag column. We meant
to cast no aspersions on Mr. Rudin. Our dictionary defines 'mouthpiece' as 'spokesman."' Id
127. Id at 210.
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in part, that the retraction was conspicuous, and that the issue of
conspicuousness of the retraction should be decided by the judge
as a matter of law."' While not deciding who should resolve the
issue of a retraction's sufficiency,129 the court in Rudin stated in
dictum that "there is some support" for the proposition that the
sufficiency of a retraction is a question for the jury.13° Without
divulging any rationale for the alleged support, the Rudin court
remanded the case on grounds independent from the sufficiency
issue. 131
c. Pierce v. San Jose Mercury News
The most recent California decision to consider the
determination of conspicuousness under section 48a was the Sixth
Appellate District case of Pierce v. San Jose Mercury News.
1 32
The San Jose Mercury News published an article reporting the
findings of the Santa Clara Police Department's Internal Affairs
Unit investigation into alleged misconduct by members of the elite
undercover Specific Crime Action Team (SCAT). 133 The article
128. Id at 216-17. The other main contention of the motion to dismiss was that the expression
"mouthpiece" was not capable of conveying a defamatory meaning. Id. at 213-16. The court held
that "mouthpiece" was reasonably susceptible to both innocent and defamatory meanings, thus
rejecting Dow Jones' contention. Id, at 216.
129. The court found the record insufficient to render a holding as to whether California or
New York Law applied, and it therefore rejected the motion to dismiss. Id, at 216-17.
130. Id at 217 (citing the holding in Behrendt v. Times-Mirror, 30 Cal. App. 2d 77, 85 P.2d
949 (1939)). See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text (discussing the facts, holding, and
rationale of the court in Behrendt). The court did not address the conspicuousness issue, instead
focusing on the impact of the language of the retraction: "In addition, there is some support for
Rudin's argument that the question of whether Dow's retraction was fair and complete rather than
snide and insincere, as Rudin contends, is for the jury to decide." Rudin, 510 F. Supp. at 217.
131. Id The case was remanded to determine whether or not the defendant published a
newspaper or magazine for purposes of section 48a's applicability. Id.
132. 214 Cal. App. 3d 1626, 263 Cal. Rptr. 410 (1989).
133. Id at 1628, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 411-12. The article was published in both morning and
afternoon editions of the San Jose Mercury News on November 30, 1984. Id at 1628-29, 263 Cal.
Rptr. at 412. In the morning edition, the article appeared on the bottom right hand corner of the front
page under the headline "Santa Clara Cops Accused in Drug, Expense Probe." Id, at 1628,263 Cal.
Rptr. at 412. The afternoon edition placed the article at the top of the front page under the "large
bold" headline "Santa Clara Cops Accused: Drug Use, Expenses Probed." Id at 1629, 263 Cal.
Rptr. at 412.
1603
Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 23
stated that the Internal Affairs investigation, which probed
accusations of alcohol and drug abuse, misappropriation of funds,
and the negligent discharge of weapons, had resulted in disciplinary
actions by the police department against SCAT officers.1 34 The
plaintiff, Loren Pierce, was mistakenly named in the article as
being one of three police captains to receive an official reprimand
for his involvement in the alleged SCAT impropriety.
1 35
Following complaints regarding the article's veracity, the Mercury
News published an article discussing the police department's
reaction the next day.136 The Mercury News published a retraction
approximately three weeks after the allegedly defamatory article
was printed.
137
Despite the retraction, Pierce filed suit against the Mercury
News, claiming libel and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. 13' After discovery determined that the plaintiff suffered
no special damages, the defendant moved for, and was granted
summary judgment, on the grounds that the Mercury News'
compliance with section 48a foreclosed any further recovery.
139
The appellate court reversed in part, holding that it was improper
134. Id at 1628, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 411-12.
135. Id at 1628-29, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 412. The plaintiff was the first of nine officers listed in
the article as receiving punishment. Id at 1629, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 412. While the plaintiff did not
receive an official letter of reprimand, the Internal Affairs investigation concluded that Pierce's
supervision of the SCAT unit was inadequate. Id
136. Id The article, which appeared on December 1, 1984, was printed under the headline
"Police Officials Dispute Extent of Misconduct." Id
137. Id at 1629-30, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 412. The retraction, which appeared on December 25,
1984, was printed in the Mercury News column normally reserved for retractions under the headline
"Setting the Record Straight." Id The retraction, which ran on page two of the paper, read:
A November 30 Mercury News article inaccurately reported two disciplinary actions
resulting from an internal investigation in the Santa Clara Police Department. The errors
resulted from inaccurate information supplied by a source familiar with the case and from
the department's refusal to disclose specific disciplinary actions. [New Paragraph] Capt.
Loren Pierce did not receive a letter of reprimand and was not disciplined ....
Id. There was a dispute as to whether a demand for retraction was served upon the Mercury News
in compliance with section 48a. Id at 1629 n.2, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 412 n.2. The Mercury News filed
a declaration stating that it never received a demand, and the plaintiff was unable to produce postal
records to substantiate the demand's service. Id
138. Id at 1630,263 Cal. Rptr. at 421-13.
139. Id at 1630,263 Cal. Rptr. at 413. See CAL. Cv. CODE § 48a(l) (West 1984) (stating that
a plaintiff can recover no more than special damages if a newspaper publishes a retraction in
compliance with the statute).
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for the trial court to assess the Mercury News' compliance with
section 48a as a matter of law.1" The Pierce court ruled that the
interpretation of "substantially as conspicuous" under section 48a
is an issue of fact to be determined by the trier of fact, not the
judge. 141
The court in Pierce cited the Twin Coast opinion, and relied
almost exclusively on the same precedents and analysis as
employed in that case by the Second District Court of Appeal. 42
In essence, the Pierce decision did little more than reaffirm past
precedent.
The opinions in Twin Coast and Pierce both address some of
the arguments and case authority advanced by the defendant
newspapers in support of the "at law" approach to a
conspicuousness determination.'43 These cases can be used as the
foundation for an analysis of the reasons in support of an "at law"
approach to the conspicuousness issue as well as California courts'
response to arguments favoring such an approach.
140. Pierce, 214 Cal. App. 3d at 1630-33, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 413-15.
141. Id, at 1631, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 413-14. In Twin Coast, the court, despite holding that
conspicuousness was for the jury to decide, granted summary judgment because it found that no
reasonable juror could frd that the printed retraction was not substantially as conspicuous as the
original article. Twin Coast, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 662-63, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 310. Unlike Twin Coast,
the court in Pierce found a triable issue of fact as to conspicuousness. Pierce, 214 Cal. App. 3d at
1633, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 415. The court contrasted the allegedly defamatory original article with the
publication:
In the present case, in contrast, the retraction had no headline other than the usual
"Setting the Record Straight," and it was found on the bottom of page two in a holiday
edition of the paper. The defamatory statement, on the other hand, appeared in the lead
story in the afternoon edition. It was headlined "Cops Accused," and in the second
sentence mentioned a captain. Of the nine "cops accused,"" Pierce was named first. This
is simply not the case in which no reasonable juror could find a retraction insufficient
under the statutory standard. Accordingly, the question should have been submitted to the
jury for its consideration.
Id.
142. Id at 1630-33,263 Cal. Rptr. at 413-15. In fact, all of the Pierce court's support for the
jury's determination of the retraction's compliance with section 48a is derived by citing to direct
quotations from Twin Coast. Id at 1631-33, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 413-15. The court reviewed the analysis
employed by Twin Coast to interpret the decisions in Turner and Behrendt. Id. at 1631-33, 263 Cal.
Rptr. at 413-14. See supra notes 109-131 and infra notes 145-150, 177-178 and accompanying text
(discussing the reasoning and bases for the holding in Twin Coast).
143. See Twin Coast, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 661-62, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 312-13; Pierce, 214 Cal.
App. 3d at 1632-33, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 414 (addressing some of the arguments in favor of an at law
approach to conspicuous determinations under section 48a).
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B. Conspicuousness as a Question for the Judge to Decide as a
Matter of Law
Although the courts in Twin Coast and Pierce did not explicitly
recapitulate the reasons offered by the defendants, on appeal, in
support of an at law approach to conspicuousness interpretations,
the substance of the defendant's arguments can be discerned. The
next sections will formulate the defendant's arguments based on the
authority cited by the courts in Twin Coast and Pierce.144 The
arguments in favor of an at law approach will be derived from
comparing the judge's role in other areas of California defamation
law as well as from other state's retraction statutes.
1. Analogizing the Capacity of the Judge to Make Decisions
in Other Areas of Defamation Law to the Conspicuousness
Determination
Proponents of an at law approach are able to utilize the role of
the judge in other aspects of defamation law to bolster their view.
The following sections will consider the judicial duties to evaluate
the demand for retraction and the fair and true report privilege and
discuss how these roles tend to support a judge-based determination
of conspicuousness under section 48a. Initially, this Comment will
address the judicial province of document interpretation and its
impact on section 48a.
a. California Evidence Code Section 310(a): Interpretation
of a Written Instrument
In Twin Coast and Pierce, both the San Jose Mercury News and
the Long Beach Press-Telegram, respectively, argued that the judge
should decide whether the retraction is published in substantially
as conspicuous a manner because such a determination is analogous
144. See infra notes 145-297 and accompanying text (discussing the arguments in favor of an
at law approach).
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to the interpretation of a written instrument. 45 Under California
Evidence Code Section 310(a), the interpretation of a written
instrument"" is a question of law for the court to decide. 47 The
courts in Twin Coast and Pierce acknowledged this rule of
evidence, yet concluded that it was inapplicable to the
determination of conspicuousness.' In arriving at their holdings,
both courts of appeal cited two examples of document
interpretation from the defamation context, under which a judge is
granted decision making power: the analyses of the sufficiency of
a demand for retraction, and whether the fair and true report
privilege is applicable.49 The Twin Coast court utilized these
examples of document interpretation to address the issue of
whether a retraction's conspicuousness is interpretive and within
the decision-making province of the judge. After giving a brief
description of the two methods of interpretation, the court in Twin
Coast, without any comparative analysis of the conspicuousness
determination under section 48a, tersely concluded that a
conspicuousness analysis did not constitute a document
interpretation. 5 ° The following sections list the two examples of
document interpretation used by the courts of appeal and analyze
their distinction, if any, from a conspicuousness inquiry.
145. TWn Coast, at 662, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 313. Pierce, at 1632, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 414.
146. Written instrument is defined as "'something reduced to writing as a means of evidence,
and as the means of giving formal expression to some act or contract BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1612 (6th ed. 1990).
147. CAL EVID. CODE § 310(a) (West Supp. 1991). Section 310(a) reads:
§ 310 QUESTIONS OF LAW FOR THE COURT
(a) All questions of law (including but not limited to questions concerning the
construction of statutes and other writings, the admissibility of evidence, and other rules
of evidence) are to be decided by the court. Determination of issues of fact preliminary
to the admission of evidence are to be decided by the court as provided in Article 2
(commencing with Section 400) of Chapter 4.
Id (emphasis added).
148. Twin Coast, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 662,256 Cal. Rptr. at 313; Pierce, 214 Cal. App. 3d at
1632, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 414-15.
149. Twin Coast, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 662, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 313.
150. Id at 662, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 313. After listing both examples, the court concluded: "In
contrast, the question of conspicuousness of a retraction is not one of interpretation." Id
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i. The Sufficiency of a Demand for Retraction: The
Twin Coast Court's Example of Gomes v. Fried
The determination of whether a demand for retraction is
sufficient was proffered by the Twin Coast court as the first
example of judicial document interpretation for comparison.
51
California Civil Code section 48a(1) requires, in part, that the
demand for correction specify the allegedly libelous statements and
demand that such statements be corrected.152 In Gomes v.
Fried,"' the Court of Appeal for the First District concluded that
whether or not the plaintiff met the statutory criteria for a demand
was interpretative and, thus, a question of law for the court to
decide.154 This decision is consistent with Evidence Code section
310(a)'s requirement that all questions of document construction
are for the court to decide.155
In Gomes, the Friday Observer, a paper published by the
defendant, ran a column, accompanied by photographs, that
contained both praise and criticism of the San Leandro Police
Department, including the plaintiff, Officer George Gomes.1 6
151. Id at 662, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 313.
152. CAL. CIV. CODE § 48a(l) (West 1984). See supra note 54 (providing the full text of the
retraction statute).
153. 136 Cal. App. 3d 924, 186 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1982)
154. Id at 936, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 611-12.
155. See supra notes 145-150 and accompanying text (discussing California Evidence Code
section 310(a)).
156. Gomes, 136 Cal. App. 3d at 928-31, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 607-08. The article, which was
published in the February 6-12, 1974 issue of the Observer, was printed under the title "HOW
GOOD ARE THE SAN LEANDRO POLICE?, An Observer Editorial Comment by Ad Fried." li
at 928, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 607. A key to the libel suit were the remarks made in regard to the behavior
of officer Gomes and another officer during a traffic stop of the author. Id at 928-31, 186 Cal. Rptr.
at 607-08. Mr. Fried was stopped for double-parking his car on a quiet residential street. Id at 929-
30, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 608. On the front page was a picture of the plaintiff sitting with his head tilted
in his squad car, with the following caption: "OFFICER GOMES car shown in the center of lightly
traveled Bristol Avenue (Sunday Afternoon) prowling for traffic violations. His head tilted may
suggest something." Id at 928, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 607 (emphasis in original). Appearing on page two
was another photograph of Officer Gomes with the caption:
OFFICER COMES writes a double parking citation on the seldom Sunday traveled
residential street (Bristol) while his squad car illegally is more than 40 inches from the
curb, permitting the dark shadows (formed at 12:30 pam., right after noontime), to
emphasize the disparity from the legal parking distance of over a foot and one half.
Neither he nor, a fellow officer, would permit a citizen's arrest of the other.
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Prior to filing a libel suit, the plaintiff served a demand for
retraction on the defendant, who did not publish a retraction.
15 7
At the ensuing libel trial, the plaintiff won a judgment from which
the defendant appealed.158 The defendant based his appeal on the
theory that the plaintiff should be unable to recover general and
punitive damages because the demand for retraction did not meet
the specificity requirements of section 48a.'59 In granting the
defendants appeal, the appellate court ruled that the determination
of whether a plaintiff's demand for retraction meets the rigors of
section 48a is a question of law for the court to decide.'
60
The Gomes court gave two reasons for its at law holding.' 6'
First, since there was no dispute as to the contents of either the
demand or the original article, the judge should make the
Id, at 930 n.1, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 608 nl.
157. Id. at 931, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 608. The demand was served on the defendant on or about
February 22, 1974, and stated, in pertinent part:
In his article, Mr. Fried directly accuses officers Gomes andAlves of"conduct unbecoming
officers' and failure to perform their duty, both of which are offenses for which Alves
and Gomes may be subject to dismissal from the police department, and both of which
they, under the circumstances alleged by Mr. Fried in his article, amount to violations of
sections of the Caljornia Penal Code. In addition to the direct imputation of criminal acts
by Alves and Gomes as set forth in the article, by implication and innuendo, the article
attributes to Alves and Gomes, among other San Leandro police officers, 'the use of
excessive force during arrest, 'ganging up of police cars,* and unspecified violations of
the law, including violations of the civil rights of citizens. Naturally, any imputation of
such acts to officers Alves and Gomes has a direct, damaging effect upon them in their
chosen profession, that of police officers, and the allegations are completely unfounded
and untrue, and Mr. Fried knew them to be unfounded and untrue at the time he made
them.
Ra. at 936-37, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 612 (emphasis in original). Receiving no retraction, the plaintiff filed
suit on October 4, 1974. Id, at 931, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 608.
158. Id, at 928, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 607.
159. IL
160. Id. at 936, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 611-12. After empowering the judiciary to assess a demand
for retraction's sufficiency, the court ruled that the plaintiff failed to meet the statutory requirements,
and could not recover general damages. I&a t 938, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 613. The demand's insufficiency
was predicated on the demand's omission of the front page photograph and its caption, which were
adjudicated to be the article's only defamatory excerpts. Id The remainder of the plaintiff's recovery
was denied due to a quantum of proof issue unrelated to the sufficiency of the demand under section
48a. Id at 938-41, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 613-15.
161. Id at 936-39, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 611-13.
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sufficiency determination on the basis of these undisputed
facts.162 Second, when analyzing the specificity of the demand,
the judge must compare the contentions in the retraction request
with the allegedly defamatory article. 63
The Gomes court concluded that the judge should determine the
sufficiency of the demand for retraction as a matter of law. t64 In
evaluating the rationale behind this decision, it is apparent that the
conspicuousness analysis is, arguably, analogous to the specificity
determination. If the inquiry into conspicuousness is comparable to
the demand analysis, then the decision maker's role under section
48a is interpretive, and, thus, a question of law for the court under
California Evidence Code section 310(a).16
Media defendants, such as those in Twin Coast and Pierce, may
advance several reasons to liken the conspicuousness analysis to
the determination of a demand's sufficiency. First, the facts in both
scenarios are undisputed. The existence and content of the original
article and the printed retraction are readily and independently
verifiable, and are almost always stipulated to in a defamation suit.
Second, both types of analysis involve the comparison of two
documents to each other.1" While the focus of a court's inquiry
162. 1, at 936, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 612. The court cited the cases of Molina v. Retail Clerks
Unions, 111 Cal. App. 3d 872, 168 Cal. Rptr. 906 (1980) and Panopulos v. Maderis, 47 Cal. 2d 337,
303 P.2d 738 (1956), to support its holding as to the adjudication of undisputed facts. Id See
Panopulos, 47 Cal. 2d at 341, 303 P.2d at 741 (holding that when the facts underlying a contention
newly made on appeal are undisputed and no separate showing could be made at trial, the appellate
court can decide the issue as a matter of law); Molina, 111 Cal. App. 3d at 878, 168 Cal. Rptr. at
909 (holding that when an argument's underlying facts are uncontested, the court can assess the
argument as a question of law).
163. Gomes, 136 Cal. App. 3d at 938, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 613. The court explained that its
method of inquiry in entailed deciding whether the defendants could have reasonably understood,
from reading the demand for retraction, that a retraction of the photograph and caption were to be
included as part of any published retraction. 1d
164. Id at 936, 186 Cal. Rptr. 611-12. See supra notes 153-170 and accompanying text
(explaining the holding in Gomes).
165. See supra notes 146-147 and accompanying text (explaining that California Evidence Code
section 310(a) allocates the construction of written documents to the judge).
166. When determining the sufficiency of a demand for retraction, the judge is to analyze the
specificity of the demand for retraction in light of the allegedly defamatory publication. Gomes, 136
CaL App. 3d at 938, 186 Cal. Rplr. at 613. An analysis of conspicuousness entails comparing the
locetion, type size, and edition of the allegedly defamatory original with the subsequently published
retraction. Twin Coast, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 662-63, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 313-14; Pierce, 214 Cal. App.
3d at 1633, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 415.
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in each analysis is somewhat different, both demand and
conspicuousness determinations require the judge to make
interpretive decisions as to the contents and impact of several
different documents. 167 To that extent, it can be argued that the
determination of conspicuousness is sufficiently interpretative to
bring it under the guise of California Evidence Code section
310(a).' 68
The second basis which the Gomes court used to justify having
the judge make the conspicuousness decision was the public policy
considerations underlying the adoption of section 48a.' 69 While
public policy rationales may be used to support a judiciary-based
determination of conspicuousness, 70  the considerations
underlying the demand specificity requirements are not particularly
supportive of such an endeavor.
ii. California Civil Code Section 47(4): Fair and True
Report of An Official Government Proceeding
California Civil Code section 47 enumerates five privileges that
a media defendant may assert to avoid liability for the publication
of otherwise defamatory material."7 Section 47(d) protects the
167. Under section 48a, the decision maker must analyze the retraction in light of the original
defamatory article. CAL. CIV. CODE § 48a (West 1984). The judge considers such factors as
placement, headline, and type size. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (describing the methods
employed to determine whether or not a retraction is substantially as conspicuous as the defamatory
article). The procedure for analyzing a demand involves the comparison of the contentions
enumerated in the retraction request with the allegedly defamatory publication. Gomes, 136 Cal. App.
3d at 938, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 613.
168. See supra notes 145-150 and accompanying text (discussing California Evidence Code §
310(a) and its use as precedent by the courts in Pierce and Twin Coast).
169. Gomes, 136 Cal. App. 3d at 936-38, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 612-13. The legislature's main
objective in enacting the demand specificity requirement was to expedite the publisher's investigation
into potential errors so that a timely retraction could be printed and liability avoided. Id. at 937, 186
Cal. Rptr. at 612 (citing Kapellas v. Kofnan, I Cal. 3d 20, 30-31, 81 Cal. Rptr. 360, 459 P.2d 912,
917-18, 81 Cal. Rptr. 360, 365-66 (1969).
170. See infra notes 268-297 and accompanying text (explaining the public policies underlying
the enactment of section 48a and arguing that these rationales necessitate an at law approach to the
conspicuousness question).
171. CAL CIV. CODE § 47 (Deering Supp. 1991). In 1990, California Civil Code § 47 was
amended and the subsections were redesignated from (1)-(5) to (a) to (e). 1990 Cal. Stat. Ch. 1491,
§ 1 at 4-5 (amending CAL CIV CODE § 47). Since the substantive portions of each privilege have
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remained constant, the alphabetical designations will be used in order to reflect the current statute.
For example, in the following discussion, all references to section 47(4) will be enumerated as section
47(d), unless the reference to section 47(4) appears in the title of a law journal article. California
Civil Code § 47 reads, in its entirety:
§ 47. Privileged communication or broadcast
A Privileged publication or broadcast is one made:
(a) In the proper discharge of an official duty.
(b) In any (1) legislative or (2) judicial proceeding, or (3) in any other official proceeding
authorized by law, or (4) in the initiation or course of any other proceeding authorized by
law and reviewable pursuant to Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 1084) of Title 1 of
Part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, except as follows:
(1) An allegation or averment contained in any pleading or affidavit filed in an
action for marital dissolution or legal separation made of or concerning a person by or
against whom no affirmative relief is prayed in the action shall not be a privileged
publication or broadcast as to the person making the allegation or averment within the
meaning of this section unless the pleading is verified or affidavit sworn to, and is being
made without malice, by one having reasonable and probable cause for believing the truth
of the allegation or averment and unless the allegation or averment is material and
relevant to the issues in the action.
(2) This subdivision does not make privileged any communication made in
furtherance of an act of intentional destruction or alteration of physical evidence
undertaken for the purpose of depriving any party to litigation of the use of that evidence,
whether or not the content of the communication is the subject of subsequent publication
or broadcast which is privileged pursuant to this section. As used in this paragraph,
"'physical evidence" means evidence specified in Section 250 of the Evidence Code or
evidence that is property of any type specified in section 2031 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
(c) In a communication, without malice, to a person interested therein, (1) by one who is
also interested, or (2) by one who stands in such a relation to the person interested as to
afford a reasonable ground for supposing the motive for the communication to be
innocent, or (3) who is requested by the person interested to give the information.
(d) By a fair and true report in a public journa of (l) a judcia (2) legislative, or (3)
other public official proceeding, or (4) of anything said in the course thereof, or (5) of
a verified charge or complaint made by any person to a public officia upon which
complaint a warrant has been issueL
(e) By a fair and true report of(1) the proceedings of a public meeting, if the meeting was
awfully convened for a lawful purpose and open to the public, or (2) the publication of
the matter complained of was for the public benefit
CAL. Civ. CODE § 47 (West Supp. 1992) (emphasis added). For a discussion of the privileges
accorded under section 47(b) for statements made during an official proceeding, see Comment,
Absolute Privilege and California Civil Code Section 47(2): A Need For Consistency, 14 PAC. LJ.
105 (1982) (discussing the privilege for defamatory statements made in judicial proceedings in light
of policy considerations and other extrinsic influences impacting judicial construction of California
Civil Code section 47(b)); Comment, It Is Time To End The Lawyer's Immunity From Countersuit,
35 UCLA L REv. 99, 111-20 (1987) (considering lawyers immunity from liability for statements
made in the course of litigation and explaining how judicial decisions may narrow the scope of
lawyer's liability); Comment, Defamatory Statements Made By Witness At Legislative Investigation,
15 S. CAL L REV. 276 (1926) (arguing that California Civil Code section 47(b) should be
interpreted as a qualified privilege which balances society's interest in free disclosure with
individuals' reputational interests); Comment, Absolute Privilege in California: The Scope of Civil
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publisher of a "fair and true report" of an official proceeding from
liability.172 This privilege enables a newspaper to report on public
proceedings, such as those occurring in the legislature and the
courts, 73 without having to independently verify the veracity of
Code Section 47(2), 7 U.S.F. L REv. 176 (1972) (discussing the purpose, legislative history, and
judicial interpretation of California Civil Code section 47(2)); Comment, California Civil Code
Section 47(2): Do Remedies Exist For Those Injured By the Privilege?, 18 Sw. U.L REv. 127 (1988)
(analyzing the decision in Rens v. Woods, 193 Cal. App. 3d 1134,238 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1987), in light
of the underlying purposes of California Civil Code section 47(b)); Note, Williams v. Taylor:
Communications to Police With Absolute Immunity: Revenge Courtesy of Caliornia Civil Code
Section 47(2) (Absolute Privilege For Complaints Made to Law Enforcement Officers), 18 U. WEST
L.A. L REV. 51 (1986) (arguing that communications between a complaining witness and the police
should be afforded a qualified privilege instead of an absolute privilege so as to avoid shielding
malicious witnesses from liability). For a discussion of the privilege enumerated in section 47(c), see
Note, Defining Calfornia Civil Code Section 47(3): the Resurgence of Self-Governance, 39 STAN.
L. Ray. 1201 (1987) (advocating a public interest extension to section 47(c) because this expanded
privilege conforms with first amendment interests in promoting citizen involvement in government);
Comment, California Civil Code Section 47(3): Should There Be a Public Interest Privilege in
California?, 20 LOY. L.A. L REV. 1559 (1987) (arguing that California Civil Code section 47(c)
should be definitively interpreted by California courts as a qualified privilege for the media to report
on matters of public interest); Browne & Sachs, The End of Libel in Labor Law Cases, 62 A.B.A.
J. 456 (1976) (discussing the Supreme Court's decisions in NLRB v. Gissel, 395 U.S. 575 (1969) and
Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974) and their impact on immunity from
defamation suit in labor related cases).
172. CAL. CIV. CODE § 47(d) (West Supp. 1991). See Note, When Truth andAccuracy Diverge:
The Fair Report of a Dated Proceeding, 34 STAN. L. Ray. 1041 (1982) (discussing the privilege of
fair report as it applies to accounts of proceedings not altered by intervening events as well as reports
of "dated proceedings," and arguing that the courts should extend the same privilege to current and
dated proceedings unless the publisher acted recklessly in not checking the facts of the dated
proceeding ); Comment, Price v. Viking Penguin, Inc.: The Neutral Reportage Privilege and Robust
Wide Open Debate, 75 MINN. L. REv. 157, 161-64 (1990) (explaining the fair report privilege and
discussing the legal theories underlying this privilege); Bloom, The Press and the Law: Some Issues
In Defamation Litigation Involving Media Coverage Of Legal Affairs And Proceedings, 43 Sw. L.
1011, 1047-50 (1990) (considering the courts' application of the fair report privilege and their
emphasis on fairness and a layman's standard); Note, Fair Report Privilege-Does The Self-Report
Exception Apply When a Newspaper Defendant Fairly Reports Statements Made By a Witness During
Its Own Litigation?, 18 N.M. L REV. 223 (1988) (discussing the case law development of the fair
report privilege as well as the reasons for allowing a newspaper to escape liability under the self-
report privilege); Comment, Reports Upon Public Proceedings and Documents: Absolutely Protected
By Constitutional Privilege, 1985 U. ILL. L. Ray. 1059 (1985) (discussing the impact of New York
Times v. Sullivan and its progeny on the scope of the fair report privilege); Comment, Neutral
Reportage: The Case For A Statutory Privilege, 86 Nw. U.L REV. 417, 422-25 (1992) (explaining
how the common law privilege of fair report has been used to justify the creation of a neutral
reportage privilege).
173. In assessing what constitutes a "judicial proceeding" under section 47(d), courts have
utilized a comparatively broad interpretation. Cox v. Los Angeles Herald-Examiner, 234 Cal. App.
3d 1618, 1623,286 Cal. Rptr. 419, 423 (1991). The judicial privilege includes preliminary attorney-
client discussions and interviews when such discussions are linked to a pending or anticipated legal
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the statements made therein. 74 While the fair and true report
privilege is considered absolute, 75 a newspaper's account of the
public proceeding must accurately convey the gist or sting of the
proceeding to successfully assert the privilege.
176
As with the sufficiency of the demand for retraction analysis,
the courts in Twin Coast and Pierce used the role of the judge in
a Civil Code section 47(d) decision as an example of the
interpretation of a document. 177 Under this statute, the judge
decides whether a publication is a fair and true report when the
events of the proceeding and the text of the allegedly defamatory
report are not in dispute. 78
Several California appellate cases give representative accounts
of the methods that judges employ to arrive at a decision regarding
action. Id. at 1624, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 423.
174. McClatchy Newspapers v. Superior Court, 189 Cal. App. 3d 961,974,234 Cal. Rptr. 702,
710 (1987).
175. I Section 47(d)'s privilege is not contingent on a showing of absence of malice. Id A
newspaper may claim statutory protection even if it has published statements known to be false, as
long as it has accurately reported on the public proceeding. Id
176. Id; Cox, 234 Cal. App. 3d at 1629,286 Cal. Rptr. at 425. A newspaper is accorded a fair
degree of flexibility and literary license in determining what is a fair report, and is not obligated to
publish the exact statements made. Reader's Digest Association v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 244,
261, 690 P.2d 610, 208 Cal. Rptr. 137 (1984). A newspaper is not accountable for all conceivable
interpretations that a plaintiff might assign to its report. Grillo v. Smith, 144 Cal. App. 3d 868, 874,
193 Cal. Rptr. 414, 418 (1983). A fair and true report is judged by how an average reader would
reasonably interpret the allegedly defamatory article. Kilgore v. Younger, 30 Cal. 3d 770, 777, 640
P.2d 793, 797, 180 Cal. Rptr. 657, 661 (1982).
177. Pierce, 214 Cal. App. 3d at 1632, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 414; TWn Coast, 208 Cal. App. 3d
at 662, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 313. Under the Evidence Code, the construction of a document is a question
of law for the judge to decide. CAL. EviD. CODE § 310(a) (West Supp. 1991). See supra note 147
(printing the full text of California Evidence Code section 310(a)). See also supra notes 160-167 and
accompanying text (discussing the judge's role in document interpretation while assessing a demand
for retraction).
178. Pierce, 214 Cal. App. 3d at 1632, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 414; Twin Coast, 208 Cal. App. 3d
at 662,256 Cal. Rptr. at 313. See McClatchy Newspapers v. Superior Court, 189 Cal. App. 3d 961,
976, 234 Cal. Rptr. 702, 711 (1987) (stating that when what has occurred in a judicial proceeding
and what was reported are not in dispute, the judge decides under section 47(d) as a matter of law);
Jennings v. Telegram-Tribune Co.. 164 Cal. App. 3d 119, 126-27,210 Cal. Rptr. 485,488-89 (1985)
(holding that when the underlying facts are not in dispute, the judge should decide at law); Kilgoro
v. Younger, 30 Cal.3d 770,777, 640 P.2d 793, 797, 180 Cal. Rptr. 657, 661 (1982) (holding that it
was proper for a judge to determine whether a newspaper's publishing of the plaintiff's name based
on his implication in an official report was "'fair and true").
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the applicability of section 47(d)'s absolute privilege. 79 As noted
earlier, the judge must ascertain whether the allegedly defamatory
report embodies the gist or sting of the official proceeding. 8 In
McClatchy Newspapers v. Superior Court,'8' the plaintiff sued
the Fresno Bee claiming that an article which linked him to the
"Fresno Mob" was libelous.1 2 The newspaper asserted an
absolute privilege under section 47(d), claiming that its article was
a fair and true report of a deposition and an official government
report." 3 The Fresno Bee sought and was granted a peremptory
writ of mandate requiring the trial court to grant a motion for
summary judgment under the privileges of California Civil Code
sections 47(b) and 47(d). 84 In deciding the section 47(d) claim,
the court compared the allegedly defamatory article to the official
sources that served as the article's foundation.'8" The court in
McClatchy Newspapers held that the Fresno Bee article accurately
captured the gist of the reporter's deposition testimony and
published a direct quote from a government report, thus entitling
the newspaper to an absolute shield under the fair and true report
privilege.' The use of similar methods by a judge to assess the
applicability of section 47(d)'s privilege can be found in several
California appellate court cases.8 7
179. See infra notes 179-187 and accompanying text (discussing cases that explain the scope
of the judge's decision-making capacity under California Civil Code Section 47(d)).
180. Jennings, 164 Cal. App. 3d at 126, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 488. See supra note 172-176
(explaining the legal standards for what constitutes a fair and true report).
181. 189 Cal. App. 3d 961, 234 Cal. Rptr. 702 (1987).
182. Id. at 965,234 Cal. Rptr. at 703. The article appeared in the May 31, 1982 edition of the
Fresno Bee. Id
183. Id. at 974, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 710. The article cited the deposition of a reporter in an
unrelated libel case who identified the plaintiff, Paul S. Mosesian, as being tied to the "Fresno
Mob." Id at 965,234 Cal. Rptr. at 703. The deponent defined "'Fresno Mob" as being 'people who
enter into conspiracies to subvert our laws.- IU The second mention of the plaintiff in the article was
a verbatim quote from a California State Department of Justice Report (commonly known as the Gill
Report) which linked the plaintiff, among others, to organized crime. Id. at 977, 234 CaL Rptr. at
712.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 976,234 Cal. Rptr. at 711.
186. Id. at 976-77, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 711-12.
187. In the recently decided case of Cox v. Los Angeles Herald Examiner, the defendant
published an article which stated that the plaintiff was "implicated in the teen-age night club fire"
and had 'a history of arson fires at their properties." Cox, 234 Cal. App. 3d at 1628, 286 Cal. Rptr.
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While the courts in Twin Coast and Pierce hold that analysis
under section 47(d) constitutes document interpretation, 88 and
that the determination of conspicuousness under section 48a does
not,"89 several arguments can be advanced to illustrate the
similarity between the two analyses. First, the relevant facts in
issue under both sections 47(d) and 48a are undisputed. Whether
or not a newspaper can claim the fair and true report privilege is
based on a judge's comparison of the uncontested official
proceeding records with the content of the newspaper article.
190
Likewise, section 48a requires the comparison of allegedly libelous
statements with the published retraction in order to determine if the
latter was substantially as conspicuous as the former. 9" Thus,
under both analyses, the items used in the evaluations are
undisputed documents which are verifiable by access to a public
record.
Second, the determinations under sections 47(d) and 48a both
require an appraisal of the relationship of one document to
subsequently published articles. " In assessing these
at 426. The defendant's article utilized an affidavit filed by a Los Angeles Fire Department arson
investigator as the basis for its accusations against the plaintiff. I&, at 1621-22,286 Cal. Rptr. at 421-
22. After determining that section 47(d) was applicable, the court compared the article to the
affidavit. M, at 1628-29,286 Cal. Rptr. at 426. While not finding the newspaper's specific allegations
contained within the affidavit, the court held that the tone of the affidavit coupled with the inspector's
recommendation of further investigation into the plaintiff's involvement in the fire were sufficient
to support the defendant's assertion of an absolute privilege under section 48(d). Md. at 1628-29, 286
Cal. Rptr. at 426. In Jennings v. Telegram-Tribune, the court compared the plaintiffs plea of no
contest to "willfully and knowingly" failing to file an income tax return with newspaper articles
stating that he had plead no contest to charges of "tax evasion" and "tax fraud." Jennings, 164 Cal.
App. 3d at 122-24,210 Cal. Rptr. at 485-86. After comparing the official plea with the newspaper's
version, the appeals court held that the trial court was correct in holding that the newspaper
accurately captured the gist, which was that the plaintiff had plead no contest to serious tax crimes.
Md4 at 127, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 489. In Kilgore v. Younger, the California Supreme Court ruled that,
after a comparison of an Attorney General's report with a newspaper article, that a newspaper was
entitled to protection under section 47(d). Kilgore, 30 Cal. 3d. at 777, 180 Cal. Rptr, at 661.
188. Pierce 214 Cal. App. 3d at 1632, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 414; Twin Coast, 208 Cal. App. 3d
at 662, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 313.
189. Pierce, 214 Cal. App. 3d. at 1632, 263 Cal. Rptr. 414.
190. See supra notes 179-187 and accompanying text (discussing the methods used by the
judge to determine whether an article is a fair and true report).
191. CAL Civ. CODE § 48a(2) (West 1985).
192. See supra notes 171-176, 185-187 and accompanying text (explaining the analytical
process under California Civil Code sections 47(d)).
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relationships, the statutes require the application of broad legal
standards."' Inquiries into whether a retraction is substantially as
conspicuous as the original, or whether an article captures the
"gist" of a public proceeding, involve the application of a flexible
standard to undisputed facts.
In their application, the legal standards of 48a and 47(d) are
similar to the extent that the nature of the inquiry under both is
almost the same. Under section 47(d) an article captures the gist or
sting of a proceeding when the proceeding's "very substance is
accurately conveyed," while allowing for a degree of literary
license and flexibility.19 4 "Substantially as conspicuous" means
that the retraction must be published in materially or essentially the
same manner as the original defamatory article.195 Thus, both
47(d) and 48a require the comparison of the substantive similarity
of two separate undisputed documents.
Since both the fair and true report privilege and the retraction
statute involve the application of comparable legal standards to
determine the legal effect of a subsequently published article, it can
be argued that both sections involve document interpretation as
enumerated in Evidence Code section 310(a). 196 If one finds
section 48a analogous to 47(d), and, therefore, interpretive, then it
is logical to conclude that a judge should be able to determine the
conspicuousness of a retraction as a matter of law. Even though the
courts deciding Twin Coast and Pierce did not find Civil Code
sections 48a and 47(d) to be analogous to interpretive analyses
193. See supra note 176 and accompanying text (stating that for a newspaper to claim the
section 47(d) privilege, its article must capture the gist of the official proceedings). See also supra
notes 65-69 and accompanying text (explaining that protection under section 48a is conditioned on
the timely printing of a retraction in as substantially as conspicuous a manner as the allegedly
libelous article).
194. McClatchy Newspapers, 189 Cal. App. 3d at 975-76, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 711.
195. BLAcK's LAw DIcTIoNARY 1428-29 (6th ed. 1990). Black's defines "'substantially" as
foi o: "Essentially; without material qualification; in the main; in substance; materially; in a
substantial manner. About, actually, competently, and essentially." l (citation omitted).
196. See supra notes 188-195 and accompanying text (comparing the analyses under sections
48a and 47(d)).
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justifying judicial decision making,"9 other jurisdictions have
allowed the judge to interpret the sufficiency of a retraction as a
matter of law.
198
2. Comparison of Conspicuousness Analysis Under California
Civil Code Section 48a to the Approach Employed in Other
Jurisdictions
In deciding whether the conspicuousness of a retraction was a
question of law for the court or a question of fact for the jury, the
courts in Twin Coast and Pierce considered out-of-state authority
which held that a judge should decide the issue as a matter of
law."9 Although those courts rejected out-of-state approaches and
adopted the California authority of Behrendt v. Times-Mirror"°
as controlling, it is helpful to consider the manner in which other
states deal with conspicuousness determination.
a. Minnesota: The Case of Gray v. Times Newspaper Co.
In the 1898 case of Gray v. Times Newspaper,"1  the
Minneapolis Times published an article regarding false complaints
to the police in which the plaintiff, James Gray, was accused of
lying about the reason that he was shot.2"2 In response, Gray
197. Pierce, 214 Cal. App. 3d at 1632, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 414; Twin Coast, 208 Cal. App. 3d
at 662, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 313. After stating that the judge decides whether an article is a fair and true
report, the court, without further analysis, concluded: "In contrast, the question of conspicuousness
of a retraction is not one of interpretation." l; Pierce, 214 Cal. App. 3d at 1632, 263 Cal. Rptr. at
414 (quoting Twin Coast, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 662, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 313).
198. See infira notes 201-221 and accompanying text (discussing the at law approaches adopted
in Michigan and Minnesota).
199. Pierce, 214 Cal. App. 3d at 1632,263 Cal. Rptr. at 414; Twin Coast, 208 Cal. App. 3d
at 661, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 313.
200. See supra notes 95-101 and accompanying text (discussing the holding of Behrendt and
its subsequent adoption as precedent).
201. 77 N.W. 204 (Minn. 1898).
202. Id, at 205. The article was published on August 19, 1897 under the headline "Faking
Hold-ups. Police have Enough to Do without This Annoyance. Two or Three Cases Where Robberies
were Complained of, and Never Occurred," and, in part, read:
Fake hold-ups seem to be the regular order of the day now. The police are considerably
disgusted, for, fake or no fake, they receive the usual amount of roasting from the public,
1618
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served a demand for retraction on the newspaper, which published
a retraction the following day.2"3 Although at the time, the
Minnesota retraction statute did not specify any particular form for
a retraction, it did require the retraction to make reference to the
allegedly libelous article, and to fully and fairly retract the
defamatory statements. 204 Similar to California's section 48a,
Minnesota's law stated that the retraction was to be published "in
as conspicuous a place and type as was the article complained
of.,,
205
who argue that the policemen and detectives are not doing their full duty. Within the past
few days the first fake case of note was that of a young man named Gray, who claimed
to have been held up by two men on bicycles while he was riding his wheel on Lake
Calhoun boulevard, shot in the arm, sandbagged, and robbed of about $5. Gray's case
bore evidence of sincerity, yet upon looking it up the police believe that no hold-up took
place; their real theory being that Gray was shot in a row over a woman with whom he
was bicycle-riding. Detective Hoy has a witness who claims to have seen the whole affair
... If the department can find a way to do it, it is not improbable that some people who
claim they are held up on the street and robbed, when a robbery or attempted robbery
never occurred at all, may be made an example of, as a warning to others.
Id, (emphasis added).
203. l The retraction was published under the headline "Cry 'Fake' Too Quick. Police
Discredit Stories Which They cannot Fathom," and, in pertinent part, read:
Considerable criticism has grown out of the apparent freeness with which the police cast
discredit upon every unusual hold-up or robbery, and at once assume that anything which
they cannot trace is fake... One case of this kind is the case of James E. Gray, the
young man who on the night of Tuesday, Aug. 10, was held up by two men, sandbagged,
shot in the arm, and robbed of some $5 or $6, while bicycle-riding on Calhoun boulevard.
Mr. Gray is a young man, well connected and respectable ... Mr. Gray's story of the
robbery and assault, as it occurred, was published the morning after the robbery, and was
soon followed by the usual innuendo, because it was the fust bicycle robbery which the
police had to deal with, and was a novelty, and not understood . . .A report was
circulated among police that there was a woman in the case, and as Mr. Gray has many
friends, not only in Minneapolis, but all over the state, the report embarrassed him
considerably, inasmuch as it was without foundation. The case was one of highway
robbery and assault, pure and simple.
l
204. lt at 205-6. The court explained what constituted a fair retraction under the statute when
it declared that: -'ft must, however, clearly refer to and admit the publication of the article
complained of, and directly, fully, and fairly, without any uncertainty, evasion, or subterfuge, retract
(that is, recall) the alleged false and defamatory statements therein." Id
205. Il at 206. Minnesota has amended its retraction statute since the decision in Gray. The
current statute sets specific form requirements for the retraction. MIN. STAT. ANN. § 548.06 (West
1988). "RETRACTION" in at least 18-point type must appear above the retraction. Ia The retraction
must be published in the "same place and same type" as the allegedly libelous article. IL Despite
the change in the Minnesota law, Gray is still relevant because it exemplifies the methodology used
to interpret a retraction statute which, at the time, had a standard similar to that of California Civil
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The Gray court held that the determination of a retraction's
conformity with Minnesota's statute was a question of law for the
court.0 6 The court enumerated two reasons for this holding.
0 7
First, since the issue of whether a retraction is full and fair involves
comparing and interpreting two writings, this duty was traditionally
allocated to the court. 3 Second, the undisputed nature of the
facts and the non-reliance on extrinsic evidence made interpretation
of a retraction a decision within the scope of the judiciary's
power.
209
After deciding that the sufficiency of a retraction was for the
judge to decide, the Gray court ruled that the Minnesota Times had
failed to meet its statutory burden.210 While the conspicuousness
of the retraction was not in issue, the court found that the retraction
was insufficient because it did not refer back to the libelous article,
and the newspaper did not accept responsibility for the publishing
of false remarks about the plaintiff.2 '
Gray v. Times-Newspaper based its holding that the judge is the
appropriate decision-maker on the conspicuousness issue based on
grounds directly rejected in both Twin Coast and Pierce.2t 2 All
three of the courts agreed that the interpretation of documents was
a question of law for the judge;213 however, the two California
courts held that a conspicuousness determination did not constitute
document interpretation 14 whereas the Minnesota court found to
Code section 48a.





211. Id Despite failing to receive a statutory bar to damages, the faulty retraction would still
be admissible to the jury as evidence of mitigation of damages. Id See supra notes 28-34 and
accompanying text (discussing the mitigation impact of a retraction at common law).
212. See Pierce, 214 Cal. App. 3d at 1632,263 Cal. Rptr. 414; TWn Coast, 208 Cal. App. 3d
at 662, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 313 (holding that the conspicuous determination under section 48a is not
interpretive).
213. Gray, 77 N.W. at 206; Pierce, 214 Cal. App. 3d at 1632, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 414; Twin
Coast, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 662, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 313.
214. Pierce, 214 Cal. App. 3d at 1637, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 414; Twin Coast, 208 Cal. App. 3d
at 662, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 313.
1620
1992 / California Civil Code Section 48a
the contrary.215 At least one other jurisdiction has concurred with
Minnesota's allocation of decision making powers.216
b. Michigan: The Case of Gripman v. Kitchel
In the 1912 case Gripman v. Kitchel,217 a city marshall sued
the local paper for libel based on a news item that accused him of
a participating in a "double graft system," which caused the city
to incur heavy expenses.2 Despite the publication of a
retraction, the marshall sued and was awarded damages.2"9 The
Michigan retraction statute specified that a retraction must be
published in the same type and edition as the defamatory remarks
and that it must appear in the same position as the original to the
extent "practicable." 220 On appeal, the Michigan Supreme Court
held, in summary fashion, that "the question whether it was full
and complete was a question of law for the court, and not a
question of fact for the jury."221 While the court in Gripman did
215. Gray, 77 N.W. at 206.
216. See infra notes 217-221 and accompanying text (discussing the holding in Gripman v.
Kitchel, 138 N.W. 1041 (Mich. 1912)).
217. 138 N.W. 1041 (Mich. 1912).
218. Id After alleging graft, the article reads: "'The marshall had submitted a bill to the county
for the arrest of common drunks, the bill itself stating that they were taken for violation of a city
ordinance, which would itself explain that the expense incurred should be met by the city." 1d
219. Id The decision does not contain the defendant's retraction, nor does it make reference
to its contents.
220. Id at 1042. Michigan's retraction statute, section 10,425, Compiled Laws 1897, at the time
of this action, read:
No exemplary or punitive damages shall be recovered unless the plaintiff shall before
bringing suit give notice by mail or otherwise to the defendant to publish a retraction of
the libel, and allow the defendant a reasonable time in which to publish such retraction,
and to make amends as are reasonable and possible under the circumstances of the case;
and proof of the publication or correction shall be admissible in evidence under the
general issue on the question of good faith of the defendant, and in mitigation and
reduction of exemplary or punitive damages: provided, that the retraction shall be
published in the same type and in the same editions of the paper as the original libel and
so far as practicable in the same position.
Id (emphasis added). Michigan has since amended its retraction statute. The amended statute requires
that the retraction be published "'in substantially the same position as the original libel." Mftci.
CoMP. LAws § 600.2911(2)(b) (West Supp. 1992).
221. Gripman, 138 N.W. at 1042. The court did not discuss or analyze the defendant's
retraction because the plaintiff made no claim for exemplary or punitive damages. Id The retraction
issue was based on a trial court decision to exclude a question asked by defense counsel. 1d
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not state the rationale for its assignment of the determination of a
retraction's sufficiency to the judge, its holding adds support for an
at law approach in California.
The courts in Twin Coast and Pierce addressed arguments for
and against allowing the jury to decide the conspicuousness issue
as a matter of law. While the two California appellate courts make
reference to many of the arguments in favor of allowing the judge
to decide on a retraction's conspicuousness as a matter of law,
there are several credible arguments not mentioned by the Twin
Coast and Pierce courts. Following are some further justifications
for allowing the judge to be the decision maker under California
Civil Code section 48a.
Within the Twin Coast and Pierce decisions, proponents of an
at law approach to the conspicuousness determination have
advanced several well-founded arguments.'m Arguing under
California Evidence Code section 310(a),' 3 analogies can be
made to equate the analysis of a retraction's conspicuousness under
section 48a to that conducted when assessing the sufficiency of a
demand for retraction,2 or whether an article is a fair and true
report under Civil Code section 47(d).2' s Further support for these
comparisons can be drawn from Minnesota's226  and
Michigan's 27 adoption of an at law approach. While these
arguments alone are forceful, the Twin Coast and Pierce courts'
rejection of them228 necessitates further inquiry into additional
222. See supra notes 144-221 and accompanying text (discussing arguments in favor of a
judge-based approach as deduced from the Twin Coast and Pierce cases).
223. See supra notes 146-197 and accompanying text (printing California Evidence Code
section 310(a) and explaining its impact on analysis under section 48a).
224. See supra notes 153-170 and accompanying text (discussing the judge's role in
determining the sufficiency of a demand for retraction in light of the decision in Gomes v. Fried).
225. See supra notes 171-198 and accompanying text (explaining the judge's interpretive role
under California Civil Code section 47(d) and its similarity to an analysis under section 48a).
226. See supra notes 201-216 and accompanying text (discussing the interpretation of
Minnesota's retraction statute in Gray v. Times Newspaper).
227. See supra notes 217-221 and accompanying text (discussing the interpretation of
Michigan's retraction statute in light of Gripman v. KitcheO.
228. Pierce, 214 Cal. App. 3d at 1632-33,263 Cal. Rptr. at 414-15; Twin Coast, 208 Cal. App,
3d at 661-62, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 312-13.
1622
1992 / California Civil Code Section 48a
justifications for allowing a judge to make the conspicuousness
determination.
m11. REASONS IN FAVOR OF CALIFORmIA'S ADOPTION
OF AN AT LAW APPROACH TO THE DETERMINATION
OF CONSPICUOUSNESS UNDER SECTION 48A
The final section of the Comment will combine legal analogy
and public policy concerns together to formulate two additional
reasons in favor of judge-based decision making under section
48a's conspicuousness standard. The first part will consider
conspicuousness analysis under the express terms of the Uniform
Commercial Code and how it compares to California Civil Code
section 48a inquiries. Second, this Comment will explore the theory
of the effect of jury bias on the conspicuousness decisions.
A. The Judge's Power to Determine Conspicuousness under
Uniform Commercial Code Section 1-201(10)
The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) was adopted, in part,
"to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial
transactions."2' 9 In 1963, the California Legislature, with some
changes, adopted the UCC.?
California Commercial Code section 1201(10) defines the term
"conspicuous. ' 231 The UCC states that terms are conspicuous
229. CA. COMM. CODE § I102(2)(a) (West Supp. 1992). The other purposes include the
promotion of uniform law among the states and to permit the expansion of commercial practices
through the employment of custom, trade usage, and agreement of the paties. Id
230. 1963 Cal. Stats. ch. 819, § 1101 at 1849-2015 (enacting the UCC in California). Where
appropriate, the California variations from the UCC will be noted. Within the UCC, definitions of
commonly utilized words and phrases are specified and are to be used, subject to additional
defnitions within a particular UCC section. CAL. COMM. CODE § 1201 (West Supp. 1992).
231. CAL. COMM. CODE § 1201(10) (West Supp. 1992). The section reads:
(10) "Conspicuous." A term or clause is conspicuous when it is so written that a
reasonable person against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it. A printed
heading in capitals (as: NONNEGOTIABLE BILL OF LANDING) is conspicuous.
Language in the body of a form is "conspicuous" if it is in larger or other contrasting
type or color. But in a telegram any stated term is "conspicuous.'" Whether a term or
clause is "conspicuous" or not is for decision by the court.
Id (emphasis added).
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when they appear in a form which a reasonable person would
notice. Section 1201(10) enumerates two examples of
conspicuous notations as being language of comparatively larger
type or contrasting color and a printed heading in capitals.233
Most significantly, the UCC makes the determination of
conspicuousness under the reasonableness standard a question of
law for the court.2"
There are no California cases explaining the methodology to be
employed by a judge when making a conspicuousness
determination under the UCC;2U however, several states that have
adopted the exact language of section 1201(10) have contemplated
the judge's role.236 A source of considerable litigation under the
UCC revolves around exclusions or modifications of implied
warranties under section 2-316.237 In order to alter or exclude an
implied warranty of fitness or an implied warranty of
232. 1d The policy behind the reasonable person standard is that the law disfavors concealed
and self-serving contract provisions, or encumbrances which are capable of deception. Eilmer v.
Delaware Mini-Computer Systems, 665 S.W.2d 158, 160 (1983).
233. CAL COMM. CODE § 1201(10) (West Supp. 1992).
234. Id
235. One California case mentioning an interpretation under section 1201(10) holds that a
warranty disclaimer printed in boldface type and oversized letters is conspicuous under the express
language of section 1201(10). A & M Produce v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 483 n.5, 186
Cal. Rptr. 114, 120 n.5 (1971).
236. See infra notes 237-245 and accompanying text (discussing out-of-state authority
explaining the role of the judiciary under UCC section 1201(10)).
237. Section 2316(2) of the California Commercial Code reads:
(2) subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability
or any part of it the language must mention merchantability and in the case of a writing
must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the
exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous. Language to exclude all implied
warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, that
"There are no warranties which extend beyond the description on the face hereof."
CAL COMM. CODE § 2316(2) (West 1964). See Millspaugh & Coffinberger, Seller's Disclaimers of
Implied Warranties: The Legislatures Strike Back, 13 U.C.C. L3. 160, 161-68 (1980) (analyzing
implied warranty disclaimers under UCC section 2-316 and state variations thereto); Tracy,
Disclaiming and Limiting Liability for Commercial Damages, 83 COMM. LJ. 8, 11-15 (1978)
(discussing the impacts of various forms of disclaimers under the UCC and giving advise on drafting
successful disclaimers); Comment, Consumer Warranty Law in California Under the Commercial
Code and the Song-Beverly and Magnuson-Moss Warranty Acts, 26 UCLA L. REv. 583 (1979)
(discussing the sources of consumer frustrations with warranties as well as the interaction of the
California Commercial Code with federal warranty law); Comment, Consumer Protection: The Effect
of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, 4 PAC. LJ. 183 (1973) (comparing warranty remedies
available under the UCC to those granted under the Song Beverly Consumer Warranty act).
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merchantability, the alteration or exclusion must be written in a
conspicuous manner." Applying the reasonableness standard,
courts consider a plethora of criteria in arriving at a determination
of conspicuousness.' These considerations include capitalization,
typesize, color bordering,2'  proximity to boilerplate language24'
or the signature block,242 and page placement.2 43 In addition to
analyzing the conspicuousness of warranty disclaimers under the
UCC, judges also conduct similar types of conspicuousness
appraisals when enforcing security transfer restriction244 as well
as numerous other potential burdens on a purchaser.245
238. CAi. COMM. CODE § 2316(2) (West 1964).
239. The standard applied to UCC section 2-316(2) is "'whether a reasonable person would
notice the disclaimer when its type is juxtaposed against the rest of the agreement." Commercial
Credit v. CYC Realty, 477 N.Y.S.2d 842, 844, 102 A.D. 2d 970, 972 (1984).
240. See Victor v. Mammana, 101 Misc. 2d 954, 955-56 422 N.Y.S.2d 350, 351 (1979)
(holding that capitalization, large print, and color contrasts are factors that courts consider in making
a determination of conspicuousness under UCC section 2-316(2)). New York's version of section 2-
316(2) is identical to the California Commercial Code section 2316(2). N.Y. U.C.C. LAW § 2-316(2)
(Consol. 1964).
241. See Commercial Credit Corp., 477 N.Y.S.2d at 844, 102 A.D. 2d at 972 (1984) (holding
that the proximital relation of the disclaimer coupled with boldface print made the disclaimer
conspicuous).
242. See Elmer, 665 S.W.2d at 160 (holding that the placing of the disclaimer notice directly
above the signature block contributed to the disclaimer's conspicuousness).
243. See Commercial Credit Corp., 477 N.Y.S.2d at 844, 102 A.2d at 972 (holding that the
disclaimer's presence on the first page of the agreement in boldface print helped make it
conspicuous).
244. See Ling v. Trinity Savings and Loan Association, 482 S.W.2d 841,843-44 (Texas 1972)
(holding that a judge must find something on the face of a stock certificate that draws attention to
transfer restrictions on the reverse in order to meet the requirements of UCC section 8-204(1)). The
Texas equivalent of UCC section 8-204 is identical to the version adopted in California. T1x. Bus.
& COM. CODE ANN. § 8.204(1) (Vernon 1991).
245. See CA. COM. CODE § 7210(2)(c) (West 1990) (stating that in order to enforce a
warehouseman's lien, the notification of the lien must contain conspicuous language explaining that
the goods will be sold if the debt is not satisfied); § 8407(3) (West 1990) (requiring the issuer of a
certificated security to conspicuously note any adverse claims or liens against the previously
uncertificated security); § 8408(9) (West 1990) (requiring that all statements of uncertificated
securities bear a conspicuous warning legend explaining the legal force of the documents); § 3110
(West 1990) (stating that a document is payable to order when "exchange" or its equivalent and the
name of the payee are conspicuously noted on the face of the instrument); § 5102(c) (West 1990)
(stating that UCC Article 5 applies to credit that conspicuously states that it is a letter of credit or
is conspicuously entitled as such); § 7203 (West 1990) (allowing a good faith purchaser for value
to recover damager for misdelivery, non-delivery, or delivery of non-conforming goods unless the
document of title stated conspicuously that the seller did not know whether the goods were
conforming or in fact delivered); § 8103 (West 1990) (explaining that a lien on a certificated security
is valid against a purchaser if the issuer's right to the lien is conspicuously noted on the certificate).
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The judge's statutory authority to decide conspicuousness under
the UCC further supports the argument for a similar judicial role
under California Civil Code section 48a. Many parallels can be
drawn between interpretation under the UCC and California's
correction statute. In both instances, the determination of
conspicuousness is made in order to protect the interests of an
innocent party from injury. A judge considers the conspicuousness
of a disclaimer so that an innocent purchaser is not duped into
waiving legal rights when entering into an agreement,246 whereas
section 48a assures maximum protection to a defamed individual's
reputation by requiring the retraction to be published in
substantially as conspicuous a manner as the defamatory
article.247 Both plaintiffs are also in a position of relative
weakness compared to the defendant. The UCC protects purchasers
from deception by merchants or brokers who have, most likely, the
advantage of considerable experience and knowledge.2 48 In the
instance of defamation, the publisher or broadcaster wields
considerable power because the size of its audience makes it
exclusively suited to restore the plaintiff's reputation via a
retraction.
The method of judicial analysis under the UCC is analogous to
a conspicuousness determination under section 48a. The central
focus of both processes is the consideration of a specified statement
in relation to the rest of the document.249 The consideration of
capitalization, print size, and boldface under UCC section 2-
246. See FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 310-19 (2nd ed. 1990) (discussing disclaimers and stating
that the UCC requirement of conspicuousness is an outgrowth of common law judicial protection
accorded to unsophisticated parties and individuals with little bargaining power).
247. CAL CIv. CODE § 48a(2) (West 1984). See supra notes 55-75 and infra notes 270-75 and
accompanying text (discussing the requirements and policy rationales underlying California Civil
Code section 48a).
248. See FARNswoRTH, supra note 246, at 311-19 (stating that the UCC protection of
inexperienced parties from experienced offerors is an outgrowth of the traditional common law
protection).
249. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (explaining the method of comparison between
a defamatory statement and a published retraction under California Civil Code section 48a). See also
supra notes 234-245 and accompanying text (discussing judicial application of UCC section 1-
201(10) to disputes under UCC sections 2-316 and 8-204).
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316"o is roughly equivalent to an analysis of headline size and
typesetting under California Civil Code section 48a.251 An inquiry
into the placement of a retraction on a given page25 2 corresponds
to the examination of conspicuousness by comparison of the
proximital relation of the disclaimer to the signature block or
boilerplate language. 3 Furthermore, placement, in terms of the
overall document, is integral to both processes.254
While the Uniform Commercial Code provides an example of
a legislatively sanctioned practice of judicial appraisals of
conspicuousness, there exist other, more policy-oriented reasons for
an at law approach to analyses under section 48a. The relative
capabilities and biases of judges and juries provide a convincing
argument for reversing the techniques upheld in Twin Coast and
Pierce.
B. Jury Bias: A Practical Reason for Judges to Make the
Conspicuous Determination Under Section 48a
Heretofore, this Comment has discussed the reasons for and
against judicial consideration of conspicuousness under California's
correction statute in light of existing legal precedent and analogy
to other areas of the law. In this section, the Comment will move
from the theoretical to the practical and will examine the inherent
biases of juries when it comes to assessing libel claims. These
prejudices, when contemplated in conjunction with the public
policy reasons underlying section 48a and the reasons that most
plaintiffs bring libel suits, are arguably important enough to justify
250. See supra notes 239-243 and accompanying text (stating that capitalization, print size, and
boldface are factors considered by the court under the UCC's conspicuousness analysis).
251. See id. (showing the use of type setting and headline size to determine conspicuousness
under section 48a).
252. See iUL (illustrating how the placement of a retraction on a page is a key factor in resolving
conspicuousness issues).
253. See id. (stating that the analysis of the disclaimer's proximity to boilerplate language and
the signature block are court sanctioned methods to determine conspicuousness).
254. See id. (showing how a comparison of the page number of the defamatory article
compared to the retraction is important in the application of section 48a). See also supra notes 243
and accompanying text (explaining that the placement of a disclaimer on the first page may be more
conspicuous than alternative page placement).
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a shift away from jury decision-making on the matter of
conspicuousness.
1. Studies Show Partiality of Juries in Libel Actions
Several statistical analyses have attempted to analyze the roles
of the judge and the jury in defamation litigation." 5 In particular,
a study conducted by Professor Marc Franklin for the American
Bar Foundation Research Journal concluded that juries tend to
favor libel plaintiffs at a significantly higher rate than judges."
6
Of the cases appealed, juries found for plaintiffs in ninety percent
of the media libel suits considered." 7 Judges, on the other hand,
entered judgments for the plaintiff in thirty-three percent of the
media cases that were appealed." Furthermore, when judges
found in favor of the plaintiff, they granted considerably less
255. See, e.g., Franklin, Winners and Losers and Why: A Study of Defamation Litigation, 1980
AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 455 (1980) (hereinafter WINNERS AND LOsERS); IOWA Lim- RESEARCH
PROE, supra note 1, at 95-151; Franklin, Suing Media For Libel: A Litigation Study, 1981 AM.
B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 797 (1981) (hereinafter SUING MEDIA FoR LmaE: A LmGATiON STUDY);
LRDC Litigation Study 9 - Defamation Trials, Damage Awards and Appeals II: Two Year Update
(1984-86), LDRC Bulletin no. 21 (1988); LRDC Study 5 - Defamation Trials, Damage Awards and
Appeals: Two Year Update (1982-84), LDRC Bulletin no. 11 (1984); LRDC Study 2 -- Defamation
Trials and Damage Awards: Updating the Franklin Studies, LRDC Bulletin no. 4 (Summer 1982-
August 15 1982).
256. WINNERS AND LOSERS, supra note 255, at 473. The study reviewed all reported
defamation cases decided from January 1976 to mid-June 1979. Id at 459. Cases were selected
exclusively from West Reporters. Id at 460. In all, the study analyzed 534 cases. 1, at 464. Of those,
457 were appellate cases and 77 were trial court decisions. IL When assessing plaintiffs' success or
failure rates, only the appellate decisions are utilized. Id, All 534 cases are utilized when classifying
libel plaintiffs and defendants and considering the types of statements prompting the libel litigation.
Id at 464-65. The study considered actions against both media and non-media defendants. Id at 465-
66. Media defendants were defined as newspapers, magazines, book publishers, and broadcasters. Id,
at 465. Since California Civil Code section 48a applies only to newspapers and radio stations, this
Comment will focus on data involving media defendants. When possible, the specific data for
newspapers and radio stations will be separated from the other media defendants. Of the 165 media
cases analyzed by Franklin, a newspaper was the defendant in 57 percent, or 94 cases, and radio
stations were the defendants in 4 percent, or 6 cases. Id at 479.
257. IdL at 473. The plaintiff received a verdict in its favor in 18 out of 20 jury cases
considered. Id
258. Id Plaintiff prevailed in one out of three judge trials. Id Although the number of judge
trials in the sample was small, the same rough percentages were yielded in non-media cases. The
plaintiff prevailed in 88 percent, or 72 of 82, non-media jury cases. Id, In bench trials, the plaintiff
won only 43 percent, or 9 of 21, of verdicts against non-media defendants. Id
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damages than did the juries. 9 Juries also have a greater
tendency to award punitive damages than do judges." A
subsequent study conducted by the Iowa Libel Research Project
confirms many of Professor Franklin's findings regrding jury
preferences.261  This study found that plaintiffs prevailed in
eighty-nine percent of the cases tried before a jury, whereas the
plaintiff won only forty-five percent of bench trials. 262 While
significant, the percentile disparity of verdicts for the plaintiff
between judge and jury is not by itself dispositive of jury bias.
However, the existence of bias may be inferred from analyzing the
rate of reversal of jury verdicts for plaintiffs on appeal.
259. Id. at 473.
260. Id at 477 table 10. In all the cases considered by Franklin, the plaintiff asked for punitive
damages in 25 percent, or 134 cases. Id. at 477. Recovery of punitive damages, while low for both
judge and jury media cases, was far greater in jury trials. Id Of the media cases, the jury awarded
punitive damages ten times whereas the judge did not award punitive damages in any case. Id The
small overall percentage of punitive damage recovery in media cases is most likely attributable to
the Supreme Court's decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974). See supra note 40
(discussing the holding in Gertz and its impact on the award of punitive damages in media cases).
Despite the small overall percentage of cases in which punitive damages are awarded, the
magnitude of these awards is enough to make them significant in any discussion of libel verdicts.
Since WINNERS AND LosERS, the number of cases awarding punitive damages as well as the average
amount of punitive damage awards at trial has dramatically increased. Smolla, Let the Author
Beware: The Rejuvenation of the American Law of Libel, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 6 (1983). A Libel
Defense Resource Center (LDRO study indicated that punitive damages were awarded in 30 out of
47 libel damage awards. lad at 6-7 (citing LDRC Bulletin No. 4, OcL 15 1982, at 3, 5 & table 2, 6
and table 2-B). A subsequent LDRC study found that the average award of punitive damages was
close to $8 million per punitive award. Id. (quoting LRDC Special Alert, July 29, 1983, at 1).
261. IowA LIBEL RESEARCH PRoJEcr, supra note 1, at 95-151. See Soloski, The Study and the
Libel Plaintiff. W7o Sues for Libel?, 71 IOWA L REv. 217 (1985); Cranberg, Fanning the Fire: The
Media's Role in Libel Litigation, 71 IowA L. REV. 221 (1985); Bezanson, Libel Law and the
Realities of Litigation: Setting the Record Straight, 71 IowA L. REV. 226 (1985) (summarizing the
findings and recommendations of the IOWA LIBEL RESEARCH PROJECT report).
262. IOWA I.EL RESEARCH PRojEcT, supra note 1, at 129. This data was derived from
analyzing a randomly chosen group of 188 media cases which were decided between 1974 and 1984.
ISL
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Jury verdicts for plaintiffs are far more likely to be overturned
on appeal than are the verdicts for plaintiffs decided by judges.263
Jury awards of punitive damages were overturned in eight out of
ten appeals.2  Defense verdicts, however, were affirmed at a very
high rate regardless of whether the judge or jury was the trier of
fact.265 While several factors may influence the rate of jury
verdict reversal, 21 the discrepancy between jury verdicts for
plaintiffs which were overturned, and jury verdicts for media
defendants which were overturned, tends to support the theory of
juror bias. Assuming that other problems intrinsic to jury verdicts
remain constant, plaintiffs' verdicts awarded by juries were
overturned at a high rate, around sixty percent, whereas jury
verdicts for media defendants were overwhelmingly affirmed.267
This data demonstrates that appellate courts were significantly more
likely to find some deficiency in a jury's reasoning when the jury
arrived at a verdict for the plaintiff, than when a trial court judge
awarded a verdict for the plaintiff. Given the jury's propensity to
find for the plaintiff and their correspondingly high rate of
appellate reversal, the judge would seem to be the appropriate party
to decide whether a retraction is sufficiently conspicuous under
section 48a.
263. WwNERs AND LosERs, supra note 255, at 474; id. Table 8, 476 n.49. Overall, the media-
defendant was successful in 60 percent, or 83 of 138, of appeals. I, at 476. The plaintiff prevailed
in only five percent, or 7 of 138, of the media appeals. l A more recent LDRC survey found that
the defendant was successful in 64 percent of recently decided appeals. Smolla, Let the Author
Beware, supra note 260, at 6 n.41 (citing LDRC Bulletin No. 6, Mar. 15, 1983, at 2),
The Iowa researchers found that defendants win 62 percent of their appeals of plaintiffs' trial court
verdicts. IOWA LIBEL RBSEARCH PRoJEcr, supra note 1, at 129.
264. WINNERS AND LosERs, supra note 255, at 476-77.
265. Id at 476 n.49.
266. Franklin suggests that variables that are unique to jury trials, such as problems with voir
dire and jury instructions, may contribute to a higher rate of jury verdict reversal. l at 476 n.49.
267. See supra notes 263-267 and accompanying text (distinguishing the relative success of
defendants' and plaintiffs' appeals of unfavorable jury and judge verdicts).
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2. The Policy Underpinnings of Section 48a
The adoption of California Civil Code section 48a represented
a shift from the common law of retractions.268  Unlike the
common law, the retraction statute, if complied with, constitutes a
complete bar to the recovery of all but special damages.2' Given
this break from the common law, courts have interpreted the
legislature's intent when enacting section 48a.27 An examination
of this intent provides important insights regarding whether the
judge or the jury should decide the conspicuousness of a retraction
under section 48a.
In Kapellas v. Kofinan,271 the California Supreme Court held
that section 48a was adopted to strengthen the media's insulation
from liability for incorrect statements, and encourage a more active
press. 27 2 The conditioned immunity of the correction statute was
granted to furnish publishers with a chance to remedy mistakes
before exposing the publishers to liability.273 In Werner v.
Southern California Newspapers274 the California Supreme Court
reasoned that the legislature substituted a retraction for the recovery
of general damages in order to promote society's interest in the
"free dissemination of news" and avoid exorbitant general damage
awards.27
268. See supra note 28-34 and accompanying text (discussing the common law function of
retractions to mitigate damages).
269. CAL. Civ. CODE § 48a (West 1984). See supra note 55-70 and accompanying text (listing
section 48a and explaining its impact on the recovery of damages in libel litigation).
270. Unfortunately, there are no legislative records to provide an insight into the legislature's
intent when drafting California Civil Code section 48a. The committee hearings, and other debate
concerning section 48a, were not recorded for the 1931 version. Comment, What is a "Newspaper"
Under California's Retraction Statute? Enquiring Minds Want to Know, 10 Comm & ENT 795, 801
(1988). The Archives of the Secretary of State of California contains nineteen pages of materials
alluded to by the governor prior to signing the 1945 amendments to section 48a. Id. at 801 n.34.
These documents deal only with the addition of radio stations to the scope of section 48a. Id. Thus,
our inquiry into section 48a's intent will be limited to judicial interpretations.
271. 1 Cal. 3d 20, 459 P.2d 912, 81 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1969).
272. Id. at 30, 459 P.2d at 917, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
273. Id at31,81Cal. Rptr. at366.
274. 35 Cal. 2d 121, 216 P.2d 825 (1950). See supra note 55 (discussing the holding and
ramifications of Werner).
275. Id, at 126, 216 P.2d at 828.
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The legislative purposes assigned to section 48a by California
courts are similar to those enumerated by the United States
Supreme Court when it extended the first amendment's coverage
to libel actions in New York Times v. Sullivan.276 In New York
Times, Justice Brennan recognized the constitutional goal of
promoting "uninhibited, robust, and wide open" debate on public
issues and the media's role in furtherance of such a goal. 277 While
dispensing with strict liability as it applied to media reporting on
matters of public interest in Gertz v. Robert Welch27 , the
Supreme Court expressed its fear that punishing the media for
errors may cause media self-censorship and chill the exercise of
protected constitutional freedoms. 279 Admittedly, the Supreme
Court's opinions Gertz and New York Times did not consider the
possible legislative rationales underlying state retraction statutes;
however, many parallels exist between the Supreme Court decisions
276. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
277. Id at 270. A discussion of the full extent of the New York Times decision and its
implications is beyond the scope of this Comment. Numerous legal scholars have interpreted the New
York Times case and its progeny. See SUING THE PREss, supra note 59, at 26-52 (discussing the
political and legal climate at the time that the New York Times case was litigated and decided);
Values In Conflict: Twenty-Five Years After New York Times v. Sullivan, Proceedings of the First
Annual Symposium of the Constitutional Law Resource Center, Drake University Law School, March
30-31, 1990 (background text and symposium transcript) (analyzing the outgrowth of the New York
Times holding and considering proposals for libel reform); Kalven, The New York Times Case: A
Note on 'The Central Meaning of the First Amendment,* 1964 Sup. Cr. REv. 191 (1964) (discussing
the impact of New York Times v. Sullivan on first amendment theory and doctrine as well as
explaining several possible interpretations of the case's holding); Epstein, Was New York Times v.
Sullivan Wrong?, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 782 (1986) (analyzing the practical and theoretical problems
of the New York Times v. Sullivan decision and arguing that Ihe common law of defamation better
balanced individuals' reputational interests with society's desire for a free press); Lewis, New York
Times v Sullivan Reconsidered: Time to Return to the 'Central Meaning of the First Amendment, 83
COLUM. L. Rav. 603 (1983) (discussing New York Times and proposing ways in which the judiciary
could reaffirm and strengthen its holding in light of current libel law); Ottley, Lewis, & Ottley, New
York Times v. Sullivan: a Retrospective, 33 DEPAUL L REV. 741 (1984) (analyzing the New York
Times decision in light of the civil rights movement and the case's progression to the United States
Supreme Court); Keeton, Defamation and Freedom of the Press, 54 TEX. L. REV. 1221 (1976)
(tracing the development of English and American defamation law and advocating a simplification
of the law of defamation as it relates to the defendant's knowledge of falsity and the distinction
between the publication of defamatory facts and opinion).
278. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
279. Id. at 340-41. See supra note 40 discussing the holding in Gertz and citing references
analyzing its implications).
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Supreme Court decisions and the judicially interpreted purposes of
California Civil Code section 48a.
Both lines of cases expressed a purpose to maintain and
promote a free and active press which would be uninhibited by
fears of unreasonable liability and excessive damages.28° This
consistency with the Supreme Court, if anything, adds legitimacy
to the purposes prompting the California legislature to enact section
48a.
3. Judge-Based Decision-Making Under Section 48a Avoids
the Chilling Effect on the Press
Allowing a jury with a pro-plaintiff predisposition to decide
conspicuousness under section 48a is antithetical to the purposes
underlying the retraction statute.281 Since general and punitive
damages comprise the preponderance of any libel recovery,28 2 the
jury's decision as to whether or not the retraction statute's
requirements were fulfilled will control the very scope of the
litigation. 3 Any actual, or even perceived bias, in the retraction
statute's application is counter to section 48a's policy goals
because it may contribute to media self-censorship. The theory of
self-censorship is premised on the notion that newspapers, when
faced with heightened potential liability, will refrain from
publishing articles on topics which may subject them to such
liability. 2 4 Since most news items pose little risk of liability and
280. See supra notes 268-279 and accompanying text (discussing the judicial interpretations
of section 48a's legislative purpose and explaining the Supreme Court's protection of the press in
New York 7mes and Gertz).
281. See supra notes 271-275 and accompanying text (discussing the public policy rationales
underlying the legislatures enactment of section 48a).
282. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (explaining that general damages comprise the
overwhelming proportion of defamation awards). See also supra note 260 (citing an LDRC study
showing that the average award of punitive damages approached approximately eight million dollars
at one time).
283. A defendant who fulfills the requirements of section 48a and publishes a sufficient
retraction remains liable for only special damages. CA- Civ. CODE § 48a(1) (West 1984). See supra
notes 58-59 and accompanying text (stating that special damages are almost impossible to prove in
libel cases).
284. Franklin, Good Names and Bad Law: A Critique of Libel Law and a Proposal, 18 U.S.F.
L RLnV. 1, 14-15 (1983).
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many newspapers are monopolies in their community, a publisher
is able to censor the scope of its reporting without risking the loss
of advertisers or profits.8" While the influence that apprehension
of liability has on large newspapers is uncertain, perceived risks do
seem to prompt significant self-censorship problems in small
newspapers.286
Even assuming that juries are not biased against media
defendants, the perception of bias in the application of section 48a
is enough to cause the chilling effect and quash the correction
statute's policy objectives. Believing that section 48a's conditioned
immunity may be unfairly applied, a small newspaper could refrain
from reporting on a "hot news" ite287 or pursuing investigative
stories. Without a perceived ability to correct mistakes and avoid
liability, newspapers will become overly cautious in attempting to
prevent mistakes. The result is an overly hesitant press, which is
counter to the stated policy reasons behind the legislature's
adoption of section 48a.288 Werner and Kapellas stand for the
285. Id There is no clear link between "'risky" investigative reporting or articles on scandals
or corruption and increased advertising and subscription rates. l at 15. While an investigative piece
or similar story may result in increased daily circulation for a short time, this impact is diminished
because most newspapers rely on subscriptions for the bulk of their circulation. ld Despite a decrease
in risks, advertisers seem just as likely to do business with a "dull or timid newspaper." l See
Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEX. L. REv. 422 (1975) (analyzing the effectiveness
of the New York Times and Gertz in terms of preventing media self-censorship and concluding that
Genz did benefit the media somewhat, but the high costs of libel trials continue to cause self-
censorship).
286. Franklin, Good Names and Bad Law, supra note 284, at 15-17. The difficulty in
quantifying the extent of self-censorship is explained:
Libel suits or the fear of libel suits is repeatedly described as the darkest cloud
hanging over investigative journalism. But the effect of the suits cannot be precisely
measured. Editors and reporters interviewed said unanimously that they had never killed
a news account they believed was true and important only because they feared that
ublication might lead to a suit.
Yet, the author also noted that "reporters or television news directors do not openly
discuss the chances they do not take." On television news director is quoted as saying
that reporters are asking themselves "whether it is worth it to pursue a story they know
would create time-consuming legal problems."
rd at 16 (quoting Friendly, Investigative Journalism is Changing Some of Its Goals and Softening
Tone, N.Y. Tines, August 23, 1983, at 8, col. I).
287. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text (explaining that the retraction statute was
meant to protect the publishers of "hot," or late-breaking, news items).
288. See supra notes 271-275 and accompanying text (discussing the public policy rationales
underlying the legislature's enactment of section 48a).
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proposition that an active press should be encouraged and that the
media should be afforded the opportunity to correct mistakes
without undue liability.2 9  Furthermore, the United States
Supreme Court has endorsed similar objectives when considering
the application of the constitution to the law of libel.2 °
While the interests of the press are clearly served by adopting
a judge-based analysis of conspicuousness under section 48a, the
reputational interests of the plaintiff must be considered.
291
Taking the conspicuousness question out of the jury's hands and
placing it in the judge's will not impair plaintiffs' rights. First,
there is no evidence to suggest that judges carry a pro-media bias.
While judges tend to rule for the defendant more than juries, the
rate of appellate reversal for judge verdicts is far less than for
juries.2" This fact supports the belief that judges will evaluate
the conspicuousness issue fairly. Second, juries will still be allowed
to assess and award damages at trial. By ruling on compliance with
section 48a, the judge merely decides whether or not plaintiff's
recovery will be limited to special damages.293 If the statutory
requirements are not fulfilled, a jury can still award the full range
of damages.294 Third, a conspicuous retraction satisfies most
plaintiffs' expectations when filing suit. A study has shown that
plaintiffs' are primarily interested in restoring their reputation and
that money is only a small factor in their decision to bring suit.
295
A retraction is a traditional means used to restore reputation.296
Thus, as long as judges fairly interpret the conspicuousness of
289. See supra notes 55,271-275 and accompanying text (discussing the holdings in Werner
and Kapellas).
290. See supra notes 276-279 and accompanying text (discussing the constitutional approach
to libel issues and citing further references discussing the matter).
291. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341 (stating that the desire to avoid media self-censorship must be
balanced with government's interest in protecting an individual's reputation).
292. See supra notes 255-267 and accompanying text (discussing the percentages of verdicts
for the plaintiff by judges and juries as well as the corresponding rate of appellate reversal).
293. See CAL. CIrv. CODE § 48a(2) (West 1984) (providing that a defendant's compliance with
the requirements of section 48a limits the plaintiffs recovery to special damages).
294. See d (providing that a jury may award general, special, and exemplary damages in the
event that the requirements of section 48a are not complied with).
295. IowA L.mE REsE.ARcH PROJECT, supra note 1, at 80-82.
296. See supra notes 28-70 and accompanying text (discussing the customary uses for a
retraction under the common law and modem statutes).
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retractions, the immunity accorded under section 48a will not
hinder plaintiffs because a proper retraction will mend their
reputations, and satisfy their motivations when filing suit.
The perceived jury bias provides another reason why the judge,
not the jury, should decide whether a retraction was published in
a manner that is substantially as conspicuous as the original
defamatory article. Courts have stressed the importance of a free
press unfettered by fears of unreasonable liability, and legal
scholars have described the causes and effect of the chilling
effect.2" To the extent that a judge-based approach preserves the
plaintiff's interests while simultaneously allaying the press's fears,
such an approach should be adopted in California.
CONCLUSION
This Comment has discussed the reasons for and against
allowing the jury to decide whether or not a published retraction of
an allegedly defamatory statement is conspicuous under California
Civil Code Section 48a. The California courts of appeal in Pierce
and Twin Coast relied on sparse precedent and analogy to
formulate their analysis under section 48a.29" The result was the
holding that the issue of a retraction's conspicuousness is one of
fact for the jury to decide.2 Despite the appellate courts'
holdings, numerous legal and public policy contentions justify
placing resolution of the conspicuousness issue in the realm of the
judge.
300
The analysis under section 48a constitutes the interpretation of
a document, thus making it a matter of law for the court to decide
under California Evidence Code section 310(a).30 ' A comparison
with two judicially acknowledged interpretation issues, the
297. See supra notes 281-290 and accompanying text (explaining the chilling effect).
298. See supra notes 79-142 and accompanying text (discussing the basis for the holdings in
Twin Coast and Pierce).
299. See id.
300. See supra notes 145-297 and accompanying text (discussing the legal and public policy
arguments in favor of a judicial determination of conspicuousness under section 48a).
301. See supra notes 146-147 and accompanying text (discussing the judge's assigned role
under CAL. Evit. CODE section 310(a)).
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sufficiency of a demand for retraction3° and the fair and true
report privilege,3°3 demonstrates that the processes under section
48a are, in fact, interpretive. Other jurisdictions, such as
Michigan °" and Minnesota, 5  have acknowledged the
interpretive aspects of retraction analysis when they held that a
retraction's sufficiency is a question of law for the judge to decide.
Further support for a judge-based approach can be fond in the
Uniform Commercial Code.306 The UCC expressly delegates the
determination of all conspicuousness issues to the judge. 07 A
discussion of the disclaimer of implied warranties and stock
transfer restrictions illustrates that the California Legislature has
granted judges interpretive responsibilities similar to a
conspicuousness analysis under section 48a.308 Finally, the
practical effect of perceived jury bias makes it imperative that
California adopt a judge-based approach to section 48a.3"9 If not,
the freedom of the press and other policy goals of section 48a will
continue to be impaired.
This Comment recommends that the judge should determine
whether a retraction is published in a manner which is
"substantially as conspicuous" as the original defamatory article.
California needs a uniform rule on this issue, and the California
302. See supra notes 160-163 and accompanying text (discussing the interpretive analysis
conducted when the judge determines the specificity of a demand for retraction under California Civil
Code section 48a).
303. See supra notes 177-187 and accompanying text (discussing the interpretive role of the
judge when determining whether or not a news item is a fair and true report of an official proceeding
under California Civil Code section 47(d)).
304. See supra notes 217-221 and accompanying text (discussing Gripman v. Kitchel).
305. See supra notes 201-215 and accompanying text (discussing Gray v. Times Newspaper).
306. See supra notes 231-254 and accompanying text (explaining the conspicuousness analysis
under the UCC).
307. CAL. COMM. CODE § 1201(10) (West Supp. 1992).
308. See supra notes 246-254 and accompanying text (comparing the conspicuousness analysis
under the UCC to the conspicuousness inquiry conducted pursuant to California Civil Code section
48a).
309. See supra notes 255-267,281-290 and accompanying text (discussing the perceived biases
of juries and the chilling effect).
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Supreme Court should overturn the appellate courts' interpretations
in Twin Coast and Pierce and adopt a judge-based analysis to
resolve questions of conspicuousness under California Civil Code
section 48a.
Albert Flor, Jr.
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